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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

REGIONALISM: THE SECOND-BEST OPTION?

C. O’NEAL TAYLOR*
“[Developing countries] need to recognize . . . that they are living in a secondbest world, in which international economic integration remains incomplete
due to the transaction costs . . . . [L]iving in a second-best world requires
second-best strategies.”
Professor Dani Rodrik

1

INTRODUCTION
The relationship between regionalism and multilateralism has entered a
new phase from the perspective of developing countries. The World Trade
Organization (WTO) initiated the Doha Round in 2001 with an explicit
commitment in the Doha Development Agenda2 to address the concerns of its
largest group of member states—the developing and least developed
countries—and redress some of the imbalances put in place during the
Uruguay Round.3 In the last five years, however, the WTO has struggled and
* Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law, A.B. Harvard-Radcliffe, J.D. University of
Georgia, LL.M. Georgetown University Law Center. The author would like to thank the editorial
board of the Public Law Review for the invitation to speak at this symposium and its assistance
with this article. The author also wishes to acknowledge the invaluable insights offered by
International Trade Commissioner Irving A. Williamson that helped shape the prescriptive
section of the article. Finally, the author would like to express gratitude for the able research
assistance by Justin Jenson (J.D., South Texas College of Law, 2009).
1. Dani Rodrik, How to Save Globalization from its Cheerleaders (Sept. 2007)
(unpublished paper, Harvard University), available at http:ksghome.harvard.edu/~drodrik/saving
%20globalization.pdf.
2. World Trade Organization (WTO), Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Ministerial Declaration], available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.pdf. The preamble to the
Ministerial Declaration launching the Doha Round notes that trade plays a major role in “the
promotion of economic development and the alleviation of property” and expresses the consensus
of the member states that the WTO “seek[s] to place their needs and interests at the heart of the
Work Programme adopted in this Declaration.” Id. In each section of the Work Programme, the
WTO commits itself to issues of particular concern for developing countries. Id.
3. See Frank J. Garcia, Beyond Special and Differential Treatment, 27 B.C. INT’L & COMP.
L. REV. 291, 292–98 (2004) (noting that the Uruguay Round (UR) bargain accepted by the
developing countries—exchanging discipline over trade in services and intellectual property for
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failed to deliver a comprehensive agreement truly focused on development
issues. Instead, the negotiations were formally suspended in 2006 and, despite
the continued informal meetings, have not yet resolved impasses on
agricultural trade and industrial goods4 that led to the suspension. At the same
time, regionalism has continued to grow at a faster pace than ever before.
Almost seventy regional agreements were notified to the WTO from 2003 to
2008.5 There is widespread agreement that this pace has been in response to,
as it has been since the 1990s, the status of, or lack of progress in, the
multilateral trading system.6 When the WTO does not deliver continued trade
liberalization and growth opportunities, countries begin seeking alternative
paths to trade liberalization and trade reform. A comprehensive Doha Round
Agreement that opens up areas of export advantage for developing countries

market access in textiles and agriculture—was a bad bargain). Two problems had to be faced by
developing countries following the UR and the creation of the WTO. First, the promised market
access in developed countries failed to materialize. Id. at 298. Second, the UR agreements
allowed transition periods to phase in implementation of obligations as the only real help for
implementation. Id. at 297–99. Implementation has proven extremely difficult for many
developing countries given the breadth of the new obligations and the drain they have taken on
resources. See also United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Trade
and Development Report, 2006, UNCTAD/TDR/2006 (2006) [hereinafter Trade and
Development Report, 2006], available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/tdr2006_en.pdf. The
Uruguay Round was seen as forcing developing countries to renounce the autonomy other
countries had during industrialization. Id. at 222. Additionally the bargain of the round (TRIPS
for Agriculture) has not really worked out. Id. See generally Asoke Mukerji, Developing
Countries and the WTO: Issues of Implementation, 34 J. WORLD TRADE 33, 39–64 (2000).
4. Press Release, WTO, Lamy Says New Negotiating Texts Set Stage for Crucial July
Talks (July 10, 2008), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres08_e/pr536_e.htm (arguing that
the trouble with Doha Round is about just more than these impasses). See Meredith Kolsky
Lewis, WTO Winners and Losers: The Trade and Development Disconnet, 39 GEO. J. INT’L L.
165, 169 (2007) (Lewis states that “[t]he impasse is in part a reflection of the fact that the United
States and EC are not willing to sacrifice their own protectionist measures, and as such any
statements they make regarding the importance of development assistance ring hollow.”).
5. See WTO, Regional Trade Agreements Notified to the GATT/WTO and in Force, Aug.
10, 2008, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/eif_e.xls. Statistics such as these are
somewhat misleading. These regional agreements consist of new agreements as well as
additional notifications to the WTO when an agreement is reactivated. Id. In addition, each
expansion of the EC requires another notification. Id.
6. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Trade and
Development Report, 2007, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/TDR/2007 (2007) [hereinafter Trade and
Development Report, 2007], available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/tdr2007_en.pdf. The
report quotes the 2003 statement made by then U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick after
the stalemate at the WTO ministerial meeting in Cancun. Id. at 56. It is worth quoting the
language as it stands as the official position of the United States at the time. U.S. actions since
2003 have only affirmed this position. “We will not passively accept a veto over America’s drive
to open markets. We want to encourage reformers who favor free trade. If others do not want to
move forward, the United States will move ahead with those who do.” Id.
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while still meeting the overall goals of the developed countries would offer the
largest opportunities for growth for the world trading system.7 Developing and
developed countries alike, however, have been unwilling for different reasons8
to exercise only this option. Instead, they have been pursuing regionalism as a
second-best option toward trade liberalization and economic growth.
This article attempts to address and analyze two issues: (1) how well the
second-best regionalism option meets the expectations, needs and capabilities
of developing countries and (2) how this option could be improved to address
development issues. Given the pace of regionalism and its breadth
(encompassing not only North-South agreements but also South-South
agreements9), one article cannot completely address all of the relevant issues.
Consequently, this article will examine the U.S. approach to regionalism in its
most recent free trade agreements (FTAs) with developing countries.10 The

7. See generally Sungjoon Cho, Doha’s Development, 25 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 165 (2007)
(reviewing the history of the Doha Round Suspension and prospects for its renewal).
8. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
9. North-South refers to agreements between developed and developing countries. SouthSouth agreements are those between developing countries. See Roberto V. Fiorentino, Luis
Verdeja & Christelle Toqueboeuf, The Changing Landscape of Regional Trade Agreements: 2006
Update, Discussion Paper No. 12 (WTO 2007), available at http://www.wto.org/english/
res_e/booksp_e/discussion_papers12a_e.pdf. According to this WTO review of regionalism,
there are several trends and characteristics to the newest proliferation of regional trade
agreements (RTAs). For most countries, RTAs have become the centerpiece of their commercial
policy. RTAs show an increasing level of sophistication covering services and trade areas,
reaching both multilateral disciplines. There is an increase in North-South RTAs and their
“gradual replacement of long-established non-reciprocal systems and preferences.” Id. at 2.
There has also been an increase in the number of South-South RTAs. Id.
10. The most recent U.S. free trade agreements are those negotiated or enacted under the
Bush administration. The following represents a chronological list of the agreements and their
enactment in the United States as of 2008. See Agreement Between the United States of America
and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Jordan,
Oct. 24, 2000, 41 I.L.M. 63 (2002) [hereinafter U.S.-Jordan FTA], available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Jordan/asset_upload_file250_5112.pdf;
United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, U.S-Sing., May 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026 (2003)
[hereinafter U.S.-Singapore FTA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/
Singapore_FTA/Final_Texts/Section_Index.html; United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement,
U.S.-Chile, June 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026 (2003) [hereinafter U.S.-Chile FTA], available at
http://ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Chile_FTA/Final_Texts/Section_Index.html; United
States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., May 19, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 1248 (2004)
[hereinafter U.S.-Australia FTA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/
Bilateral/Morocco_FTA/Final_Text/Section_Index.html; United States-Morocco Free Trade
Agreement, U.S.-Morocco, June 15, 2004, 44 I.L.M. 544 (2005) [hereinafter U.S.-Morocco
FTA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Morocco_FTA/FInal_TextSection_Index.html; The United States-Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade
Agreement, U.S.-CAFTA-DR, Jan. 28, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 514 (2004) [hereinafter DR-CAFTA],
available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Regional/CAFTA/CAFTA-DR_Final_Texts/
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article will focus on a number of questions from the perspective of both the
United States and its developing country partners: Why regionalism? What
kind of regionalism? Does the U.S. approach to regionalism deliver what
developing countries need? Can the U.S. approach be made more responsive to
development issues and concerns?
These issues and questions regarding the developing countries and their
needs are worth considering in light of the pattern emerging in regionalism
efforts over the last half decade. The percentage of new regional agreements
between developed and developing countries has grown substantially.11 These
new agreements also have largely been bilateral agreements between one
developing country and one of the world’s largest and most powerful
developed states either, the European Community (EC) or the United States.12
Section_Index.html; Agreement between the Government of the United States and the
Government of the Kingdom of Bahrain on the Establishment of a Free Trade Agreement, U.S.Bahr., Sept. 14, 2004, 44 I.L.M. 544 (2005) [hereinafter U.S.-Bahrain FTA], available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Bahrain_FTA/final_texts/Section_Index.html;
United States-Oman Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Oman, Jan. 19, 2006 [hereinafter U.S.-Oman
FTA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Oman_FTA/Final_Text/
Section_Index.html; U.S.-Peru (2007), United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.Peru, Apr. 12, 2006 [hereinafter U.S.-Peru FTA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_
Agreements/Bilateral/Peru_TPA/Final_Texts/Section_Index.html; United States-Panama Trade
Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Pan., June 28, 2007 [hereinafter U.S.-Panama FTA], available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Panama_FTA/Final_Text/Section_Index.html;
United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Colom., Nov. 22, 2006 [hereinafter
U.S.-Colombia FTA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Colombia_
FTA/Final_Text/Section_Index.htm; United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Korea,
Jun. 30, 2007 [hereinafter KORUS], available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/
Bilateral/Republic_of_Korea_FTA/Final_Text/Section_Index.html. See generally OFFICE OF THE
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (USTR), EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE
PRESIDENT’S 2008 TRADE POLICY AGENDA AND 2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF
THE UNITED STATES ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM, 107–15 (2008) [hereinafter 2008
TRADE POLICY AGENDA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_
Publications/2008/2008_Trade_Policy_Agenda/asset_upload_file649_14563.pdf. This article will
draw most heavily on illustrations from the most recent agreements pursued by the United States
in Latin America—DR-CAFTA, Peru, Panama, and Colombia.
11. Trade and Development Report, 2007, supra note 6, at 55 (noting that agreements
between developed and developing countries have grown from 14% to 27% of total regional
agreements from 1995 to 2007). While most regional trade agreements are South-South
agreements, it is the North-South agreements which have a greater impact on the multilateral
trading system since they are capable of taking attention away from multilateral negotiations and
have a greater impact on its core principle, most favored nation treatment. UNCTAD,
Globalization for Development: The International Trade Perspective, §1.7, U.N. DOC.
UNCTAD/DITC/2007/1 (2008) [hereinafter Globalization for Development], available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditc20071_en.pdf.
12. Trade and Development Report, 2007, supra note 6, at 56 n.8. The EC has also been
negotiating with six regional bodies of countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP),
former colonial countries with which it has had a long-standing series of preference agreements to
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Almost all of these agreements are to establish free trade areas.13 Free trade
areas have two major characteristics that have implications for developing
countries. First, they allow the greatest flexibility with regard to design and
content of the regional agreement due to the weak WTO/GATT institutional
and rules-based discipline.14 What this means is that free trade agreements can
be and are made to cover issues going well beyond trade in goods and services.
In North-South agreements, this means that the developed country is in a
position to demand that subjects of interest to it are covered at levels or to
standards it desires. Given the greater need of developing countries for the
market access and possible investment that flow from such agreements, they
have little leverage regarding the type or content of the additional disciplines
sought.15 Second, since free trade areas entail the lowest level of economic
replace the preference agreements with free trade agreements. Id. at 58 n.9. The EC recently
completed the first of these agreements with the Cariforum, the Caribbean Forum.
13. As of January 2008, the United States has eleven free trade agreements with seventeen
countries. See Daniella Markheim, Free Trade Agreements: Promoting Prosperity in 2008, 2132
BACKGROUNDER, May 2, 2008, at 1, 3, available at http://www.heritage.org/research/tradeand
foreignaid/upload/bg_2132.pdf. Only two of the free trade agreements the United States has
pursued, have involved developed economies, Canada and Australia. The EC has entered into
free trade agreements throughout the world. See European Commission, Overview of Bilateral
Negotiations Involving Trade Agreements, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/december/
tradoc_118238.pdf (last visited Sept. 1, 2008). To date, the EC has seven bilateral free trade
agreements with developing countries (Algeria, Chile, Egypt, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority,
South Africa and Tunisia) and is conducting negotiations with countries throughout the Middle
East and Africa. Id.
14. The WTO requires member states which enter regional trade agreements to notify these
to the organization. The Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) has jurisdiction over
these agreements. The WTO agreed in 2006 to establish a review process for these agreements
that would included a factual report about the operation of each regional trade agreement. To
date, the CRTA has made only limited progress on finalizing its reports. WTO Director-General,
World Trade Report 2007, 306 (2007) [hereinafter World Trade Report 2007], available at
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report07_e.pdf. See Chi C.
Carmody, Measurement and the Metrics of Regionalism: Experience with the WTO RTA
Transparency Mechanism, 28 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 273 (2008) for an analysis of existing
WTO oversight.
Historically, the GATT/WTO has never disapproved of a regional agreement.
According to the Sutherland Report on the future of the World Trade Organization: “In practice
there are now just too many WTO Members with interests in their own regional or bilateral
arrangements for a critical review of PTA terms to take place and for consensus on their
conformity to be found.” Consultative Board to the Director-General, The Future of the WTO:
Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millennium, 22, ¶ 77 (WTO 2004), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/10anniv_e/future_wto_e.pdf. For a discussion of the rules
regarding regionalism, see infra at note 21.
15. Frederick M. Abbott, A New Dominant Trade Species Emerges: Is Bilateralism a
Threat?, 10 J. INT’L ECON L. 571, 578 (2007) (The author noted that the United States offers a
template of the areas it wishes to cover and developing FTA partners do not have many
possibilities for amending it. Additionally, those countries which resisted the template, Brazil
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integration,16 each participating state retains more sovereign power. This
factor plays out differently for developed and developing countries as well.
The former have to make few, if any, major changes to their domestic policies
to participate in free trade agreements.17 By contrast, the latter not only have
major implementation obligations but also need to develop and fund
complementary national policies to gain the greatest benefits from the FTA.18
Such implementation costs could be eased with economic and technical
assistance from the developed partner, but it cannot be demanded.
I. U.S. APPROACH TO THE “NEW REGIONALISM”
During the last two administrations, the United States has developed a
complete system of agreements for negotiating and enacting regional
arrangements. The components of this system—the Trade and Investment
Framework Agreements (TIFAs),19 Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs),20
regional free trade initiatives21 and bilateral free trade agreements—cover the

and Argentina in the FTAA negotiations, were left out and isolated when the United States began
negotiations with other, more willing partners in Latin America.).
16. See generally BELA BALASSA, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 2 (Richard D.
Irwin, Inc., 1965) (1961) (defining free trade area and contrasting its limited demands with those
required for the deeper forms of economic integration, customs unions and common markets).
17. The major implementation requirements for the United States are revising its tariff
schedules and altering preference programs.
18. See infra notes 48–55 and accompanying text for a discussion of what developing
country FTA partners must do to have successful FTAs with the United States.
19. The United States currently has thirty-three Trade and Investment Framework
Agreements (TIFAs) in place. USTR, Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFAs),
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/TIFA/Section_Index.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2008).
TIFAs cover legal protections for investors, intellectual property issues, customs improvements,
and transparency regarding government and commercial regulations. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2005
INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT – UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (2005). These agreements are
often used as precursors to bilateral free trade agreements for those countries that are part of a
U.S. regional free trade initiative. For example, the Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative (EAI),
which was aimed at the ASEAN countries of Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia,
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, the United States offered free trade
agreements committed to U.S. free trade goals. USTR, Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative,
[hereinafter EAI Background], http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Regional/Enterprise_for_
ASEAN_Initiative/Section_Index.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2008).
20. The United States has over thirty-nine Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) in place. The
United States uses a model BIT when it negotiates with partner countries. See U.S. Department
of State, U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty Program, http://www.state.gov/www/issues/economic/
7treaty.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2008).
21. The United States has been involved in six initiatives that have aimed at creating either a
regional or a series of bilateral free trade agreements: EAI, the Middle East Free Trade Area
Initiative (MEFTAI), South African Customs Union Initiative (SACU), the Free Trade Area of
the Americas (FTAA), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the Central
American-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA). Two of these initiatives,
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two areas of greatest U.S. interest: trade in goods and services and investment.
These different components have been used sequentially to prepare a country
or a region for closer economic integration with the U.S. market. TIFAs are
used at the beginning of the process to set out the mutual goals of the United
States and its partner countries on trade and investment. If a country is willing
to make firm investment commitments, it then signs a BIT or agrees to such
disciplines as part of a free trade agreement. The regional free trade initiatives,
such as North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),22 Enterprise for
ASEAN Initiative (EAI)23 and the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA),24
have been used to establish the overall U.S. goals regarding important trading
regions of the world. Current U.S. initiatives cover every major continent or
region—Asia, Africa,25 Middle East, Latin America—except for Europe.
Some of these initiatives have produced bilateral free trade agreements that
have been enacted,26 while others provide a framework for a series of bilateral

SACU and the FTAA, have been suspended. Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review,
Report by U.S., WT/TPR/G/200, at 14, 15 (2008) [hereinafter US/TPR], available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/g200_e.doc. All of the other regional efforts have
produced existing free trade agreements (NAFTA, DR-CAFTA) or a combination of TIFAs and
bilateral free trade agreements (EAI, MEFTAI). Id. at 14–16.
22. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289
(containing chs. 1–9), 32 I.L.M. 605 (containing chs. 10–22) [hereinafter NAFTA], available at
http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/index_e.aspx?DetailID=78.
23. See EAI Background, supra note 19.
24. All thirty-four leaders agreed to explore the possibility of a Free Trade Area. US/TPR,
supra note 21, at 14. However, there was no agreement on the timing, and the FTAA
negotiations remained suspended during 2006 and 2007. Id. According to the United States, that
was because “other leaders indicated that conditions did not exist for the achievement of the
FTAA.” Id. For a review of the issues that led to the suspension of the FTAA, see David A.
Gantz, The Free Trade Area of the Americas: An Idea Whose Time Has Come—and Gone?, 1
LOY. INT’L L. REV. 179 (2004). For official materials on the FTAA, see the USTR webpage.
USTR, Background Information on the U.S.-SACU FTA, http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_
Agreements/Regional/FTAA/Section_Index.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2008).
25. The regional initiative here was with the South African Customs Union (SACU). See
generally USTR, Background Information on the U.S., http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/
Bilateral/Southern_Africa_FTA/Background_Information_on_the_US-SACU_FTA.html
(last
visited Aug. 31, 2008) (presenting background Information on the U.S.-SACU FTA). These
negotiations were launched in 2003, and the goal was to build on the success of the U.S.
preference program for Africa, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Id. Active
negotiations were suspended in 2006 but remain a “longer term objective,” according to the
United States. US/TPR, supra note 21, at 15.
26. The DR-CAFTA initiative lead to the Central American-Dominican Republic-United
States Free Trade Agreement. DR-CAFTA, supra note 10. The agreement has entered into force
for the United States, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic.
DR-CAFTA, supra note 10. Costa Rica could not enact DR-CAFTA without a public
referendum, which was held October 7, 2007. ICT Chamber Outlines Benefits of FTA for IT
Industry, BUSINESS NEW AMERICAS, Oct. 17, 2007 [hereinafter Business News Americas]. The
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free trade agreements.27 Bilateral free trade agreements have come about
either individually or as a part of the regional initiatives.
Once the Bush administration received Trade Promotion Authority (TPA)
from Congress28 to negotiate both multilateral and regional agreements, the
United States accelerated both the pace of negotiations for and
implementations of free trade agreements. All of the major regional free trade
initiatives were launched in 2002 and 2003. Every year from 2003 to 2007, the
United States completed, and Congress approved, at least one free trade
agreement.29 With the exception of DR-CAFTA, all of these FTAs have been
bilateral agreements.30 With the exception of Australia, all of these recent
FTAs have been with developing countries.
To fully understand what is new about this U.S. approach to regionalism
requires an examination of the history of U.S. regionalism. It is a relatively
new history because the United States focused on multilateralism and
unilateralism before the 1980s.31 The United States entered into only two free

FTA was approved by the slimmest of margins (51.48% in favor to 48.42% against). Costa Rica
has had to request an extension of its March 2008 deadline to pass all of the implementing
legislation needed to enact its free trade agreement obligations. Costa Rica To Request Extension
for Deadline To Enter CAFTA, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Vol. 26, No. 5, Feb. 1, 2008 [hereinafter
Costa Rica Deadline].
The EAI launched in 2002 produced the U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement. U.S.Singapore FTA, supra note 10. The United States has also entered into negotiations with
Malaysia and Thailand for bilateral free trade agreements. US/TPR, supra note 21, at 20–22.
27. The Middle East Free Trade Area Initiative (MEFTA) launched in 2003 has produced
three free trade agreements with Morocco, Bahrain and Oman. U.S.-Morocco FTA, supra note
10. The U.S.-Bahrain FTA was enacted in the United States in 2006. U.S.-Bahrain FTA, supra
note 10. The U.S.-Oman FTA was enacted in the United States in 2006. U.S.-Oman FTA, supra
note 10. The goal is to create a Middle East Free Trade Area. US/TPR, supra note 21, at 16.
28. Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, 116 Stat. 993,
(codified as 19 U.S.C. §§3801 (2002)) [hereinafter TPA].
29. The pattern is as follows: U.S.-Singapore (2003), U.S.-Singapore FTA supra note 10;
U.S.-Chile (2003), U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, June 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026
[hereinafter U.S.-Chile FTA], available at http://ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Chile_
FTA/Final_Texts/Section_Index.html; U.S.-Australia (2004), U.S.-Australia FTA, supra note 10;
U.S.-Morocco (2004), U.S-Morocco FTA, supra note 10; U.S.-CAFTA/DR (2005), DR-CAFTA
supra note 10; U.S.-Bahrain (2006), U.S.-Bahrain FTA supra note 10; U.S.-Oman (2006), U.S.Oman FTA supra note 9; and U.S.-Peru (2007) [hereinafter U.S.-Peru FTA], supra note 10.
30. Those bilaterals are: U.S.-Singapore FTA, supra note 10; U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note
29; U.S.-Australia FTA, supra note 10; U.S.-Morocco FTA, supra note 10; U.S.-Bahrain FTA,
supra note 10; U.S.-Oman FTA, supra note 10; U.S.-Peru FTA supra note 10.
31. See JAGDISH BHAGWATI, REGIONALISM AND MULTILATERALISM: AN OVERVIEW 3–26
(Jagdish Bhagwati, Pravin Krishna & Arvind Panagariya eds., MIT 1999); JAGDISH BHAGWATI,
THE WIND OF THE HUNDRED DAYS: HOW WASHINGTON MISMANAGED GLOBALIZATION 245–46
(MIT 2002) (noting the long-standing U.S. preference for multilateralism); C. O’Neal Taylor, The
Limits of Economic Power: Section 302 and the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement
System, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 209, 209–242 (1997) (pointing out that although the United

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2008]

REGIONALISM: THE SECOND-BEST OPTION?

163

trade agreements before the two most recent administrations: the U.S.-Israel
FTA32 (enacted in 1985) and the U.S.-Canada FTA33 (enacted in 1988).
During the Clinton administration, the United States enacted NAFTA in 199334
but otherwise focused its energies on negotiations for an agreement to create a
hemispheric Free Trade Area of the Americas. The Clinton administration
began informal bilateral talks with some of the countries35 that approached the
United States about entering into free trade agreements (Jordan, Chile,
Singapore and Australia).36 Deprived of the required negotiating authority to
complete any agreements, however, the Clinton administration brought only
one to fruition.
When the succeeding Bush administration obtained that authority in 2002,
it broadened the U.S. approach to regionalism and began to pursue some new
regional trade initiatives (DR-CAFTA,37 Middle East Free Trade Area
(MEFTA)38 and the South African Custom Union initiative (SCAU)39),
continued the other regional effort (the FTAA) and began bilateral agreement
negotiations all at the same time. This move to expand U.S.-led regionalism

States has long been a champion of multilateralism, it has also been an aggressive unilateralist in
using its section 301 statute to push the world trading system into expanding the GATT
disciplines to include intellectual property and services).
32. United States-Israel Free Trade Area Agreement, U.S.-Israel, Apr. 22, 1985, 24 I.L.M.
653 [hereinafter U.S.-Israel FTA], available at http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/
All_Trade_Agreements/exp_005439.asp.
33. United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can., Jan. 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 281
[hereinafter U.S.-Canada FTA], available at http://wehner.tamu.edu/mgmt.www/NAFTA/fta/
complete.pdf.
34. NAFTA, supra note 22.
35. Once the United States announced that it would negotiate a free trade agreement with
Mexico, there was a shift in the “status quo of trade relations” in the Americas. Other countries
in the region, which were also heavily trade dependent on the United States, were faced with
trade diversion. Many of these, Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay, approached the
United States about free trade negotiations. The United States encouraged the last four to form a
regional group. RICHARD E. BALDWIN, A DOMINO THEORY OF REGIONALISM 487–88 (MIT
1999). The United States did begin negotiations with Chile during the Clinton administration
despite the lack of trade negotiating authority. Susan G. Esserman, Proceeding of the CanadaUnited States Law Institute Conference on Understanding Each Other Across the Larges
Undefended Boder in History, Speaker, 31 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 11, 14 (2005). Former USTR General
Counsel Esserman noted that the United States resisted overtures from some countries like
Singapore and Australia due to the small size of the trading relationship. Id. However, despite
the lack of negotiating authority, the Clinton administration moved at the end to begin
negotiations with some countries because of (1) the concern about the movement towards free
trade agreements around the world and (2) the paralysis of the WTO. Id.
36. Esserman, supra note 35, at 14.
37. See DR-CAFTA, supra note 10.
38. See US/TPR, supra notes 21, at 16.
39. Id. at 15.
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was made to counter a similar focus on regionalism undertaken by the EC.40
The first bilateral agreements completed and enacted were with those countries
that had approached the Clinton administration: Jordan (2001), Chile (2003),
Singapore (2003) and Australia (2004). One regional trade initiative—to
negotiate with friendly countries in the Middle East (MEFTA)—was
successful in producing bilateral agreements with Morocco (enacted in 2004),
Bahrain (enacted in 2005) and Oman (enacted in 2006). Other regional
initiatives, such as SACU and the FTAA, were not completed and have been
suspended. During and following the collapse of the FTAA negotiations, the
Bush administration negotiated free trade agreements with Latin American
countries—DR-CAFTA (enacted in 2005), Peru (enacted in 2007), Panama
(signed 2007, but not yet enacted)41 and Colombia (signed 2007, but not yet
enacted).42 One other major bilateral FTA with South Korea, KORUS,43 was
also signed in 2007 but has not yet been approved by Congress. Although
TPA expired in 2007, the Bush administration pursued passage of these
completed agreements.44
II. WHY REGIONALISM?
What spurred the United States and its developing country FTA partners to
pursue regionalism at this furious pace? Given the differences in size and
economic power between the parties, it stands to reason that the motivations
are quite different. For the United States, one factor is clearly not in play. The
United States has not chosen FTA partners due to the amount of trade involved
as compared to total U.S. trade. Aside from KORUS,45 none of the recently

40. Esserman, supra note 35, at 13–15. Following NAFTA, other countries moved to pursue
regionalism while the United States was constrained due to a lack of political consensus and the
“political fall out” from NAFTA. Id. at 13–14. The Bush administration, by contrast, made free
trade agreements the “vehicle of choice” for promoting trade liberalization and began accelerating
negotiations to make up lost ground. Id. at 15.
41. U.S.-Panama FTA, supra note 10.
42. U.S.-Colombia FTA, supra note 10.
43. KORUS, supra note 10.
44. Trade Promotion Authority expired in July 2007. Despite this, the Bush administration
made approval of the pending FTAs with Colombia, Panama and South Korea its top priority.
2008 TRADE POLICY AGENDA, supra note 10, at 2–3. See also Statement of the U.S. Trade
Representative Susan C. Schwab, Senate Fin. Comm., 110th Cong. (Mar. 6, 2008), available at
http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2008test/030608sstest.pdf (setting out the goal of
passing the pending FTAs before reaching a conclusion in the Doha Round of the WTO).
45. The pending FTA would cover more trade any other FTA except for NAFTA. Jeffrey J.
Schott, The Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: A Summary Assessment, PETERSON INST. FOR
INT’L ECONOMICS, Aug. 2007, at 1–2, available at http://www.petersoninstitute.org/publications/
pb/pb07-7.pdf. If enacted, the agreement would account for 3% of total U.S. trade. U.S. GOVT
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO), GAO-08-59, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: AN ANALYSIS OF FREE
TRADE AGREEMENTS AND CONGRESSIONAL AND PRIVATE SECTOR CONSULTATION UNDER
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enacted or pending FTAs have been with a major trading partner. Altogether,
the existing and pending U.S. free trade agreements account for only sixteen
percent of total U.S. trade and sixteen percent of total investment.46 What
matters to the United States is not having a large-market FTA partner but
rather having an FTA partner with open markets. For the United States, it is
far more important to continue developing its model FTA47—one that will
satisfy its commercial and, more importantly, its trade policy goals. The
United States views FTAs as laboratories for adding new subject areas and
disciplines to the world trading system.48
Due to its market size and power, the United States has had the freedom to
develop what amounts to a free trade agreement strategy. This strategy began
with a careful consideration of which countries should be pursued for FTAs.
By 2002, the U.S. Trade Representative employed a thirteen-factor list49 to
decide which free trade agreements to pursue. These factors centered around

TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY 22 (2007) [hereinafter GAO 2007 REPORT], available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0859.pdf (based on data from 2005/2006).
46. GAO 2007 REPORT, supra note 45, at 20.
47. In its review of how the Bush administration has consulted over free trade agreements
entered into under Trade Promotion Authority, the GAO interviewed the officials responsible for
trade policy and negotiations at USTR and the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Labor,
State and Treasury, the agencies which, along with USTR, form an interagency group to propose
potential FTA partners for the President. Id. at 1–2. As part of its analysis of the U.S. FTAs, the
GAO examined the U.S. strategy for pursuing FTAs and found it had two major elements—using
the theory of competitive liberalization and seeking comprehensive or “gold standard” bilateral
and regional FTAs. Id. at 17–18. According to the GAO, the recent U.S. FTAs “have a number
of absolute requirements, based on the model USTR seeks to use.” Id. at 18. In its Trade Policy
Review Report to the WTO, the United States also noted that its regional trade agreements could
“become models for future liberalization in new areas such as agriculture, services, investment,
and labor standards.” US/TPR, supra note 21, at 14.
48. USTR, THE PRESIDENT’S U.S. TRADE POLICY AGENDA FOR 2003 1 (2003), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2003/2003_Trade_Policy_A
genda/asset_upload_file666_6142.pdf (stating that the regional and bilateral FTAs promote the
broader trade agenda by “serving as models, breaking new negotiating ground, and setting high
standards”).
49. U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PUB. NO. GAO-04-233, INTERNATIONAL TRADE:
INTENSIFYING FREE TRADE NEGOTIATING AGENDA CALLS FOR BETTER ALLOCATION OF STAFF
AND RESOURCES 7–9 (2004) [hereinafter GAO 2004 REPORT], available at http://www.gao.
gov/new.items/d04233.pdf. The thirteen factors were: (1) congressional guidance; (2) business
and agricultural interest; (3) special product sensitivities; (4) serious political will of the
prospective partner to undertake needed trade reforms; (5) willingness to implement other
reforms; (6) commitment to WTO and other trade agreements; (7) contribution to regional
integration; (8) support of civil society groups; (9) cooperation in security and foreign policy;
(10) need to counter FTAs that place U.S. commercial interests at a disadvantage; (11) need to do
FTAs in each of the world’s major regions; (12) need to ensure a mix of developed and
developing countries; and (13) demand on USTR resources. According to USTR, these factors
did not have relative weights. Id. at 7.
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issues that have been pivotal ever since: domestic political support for FTA,50
the level of commitment by target countries to trade liberalization and
reform,51 the cooperation of target countries in security and foreign policy
matters,52 and strategic plans to counter other trading nations.53 Several

50. Factors 1–3 are on congressional guidance, business and agricultural interest and special
product sensitivities. According to the GAO’s interview with USTR, it “consults with the
Congress before and after FTA selection to ensure support and eventual congressional approval.”
Id. Additionally, USTR officials also examine public support, particularly from business and
agricultural interests, and assess how the FTA will affect certain sectors, such as textiles and
sugar, that have been of interest. Id.
The Executive Branch rarely moves forward if there is political opposition. See Gantz,
supra note 24, at 187 (“Even the most free trade oriented administrations. . . are not likely to
brave domestic political opposition unless there is enormous pressure from the business
community to move forward and some semblance of bipartisan support in Congress.”).
51. Factors 4–6—the political will of potential FTA partners to implement trade reform and
other reforms—deal with whether the FTA partner is willing to undertake obligations inherent in
a U.S.-led FTA. GAO 2004 REPORT, supra note 49, at 7–8. Since USTR regards FTAs as a
“development tool,” it is crucial that the FTA partner be willing to put in place other economic
reforms. Id. In choosing an FTA partner, USTR tries to make sure that the country understands
“(1) how important it is to make this commitment to reform and (2) the extent of the obligations
that a comprehensive FTA with the U.S. involves.” Id. at 8.
An example of the type of other reforms undertaken by FTA partners were those taken
by Chile to eliminate price controls and privatize state-owned enterprises. Id. at 42.
Factor 7, contribution to regional integration, is a recognition that bilateral FTAs can be
an important part of U.S. regional free trade initiatives. Id. at 8.
52. There is a direct link between being considered for an FTA and a country’s support for
U.S. security and foreign policy goals. USTR noted that the countries selected for bilaterals
under MEFTAI were supporters of the U.S. objectives in the Middle East and that “CAFTA
nations supported U.S. objectives in Iraq.” Id. at 8. See also Craig Van Grasstek, U.S. Trade
Policy and Developing Countries: Free Trade Agreements, Trade Preferences, and the Doha
Round, INT’L CENTRE FOR SUSTAINABLE TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, Information Note 4, Feb.
2008, at 7, available at http://www.latn.org.ar/archivos/documentacion/PAPER_DOCop-71.pdf.
Van Grasstek points out that the Bush administration has a narrow set of foreign policy goals:
largely supporting the U.S. policy in the Middle East, cooperating in anti-narcotic activity and
agreeing to leave the developing country coalition at the WTO (the Group of 21). Id. He also
notes that FTAs were entered into moderate Middle East States and that, of the recent FTAs
(including those not yet enacted), every partner country (S. Korea, Colombia, Panama and DRCAFTA states) was a member of the “coalition of the willing,” except for Guatemala. Id. at 7
n.5. Chile and the DR-CAFTA countries were chosen as FTA partners in part because of their
support for the U.S. positions in the FTAA negotiations. GAO 2004 REPORT, supra note 49, at
42–43, 52.
53. Factor 10—countering FTAs that place the U.S. commercial interests at a
disadvantage—deals with one of the realities of the proliferation of regional agreements. GAO
2004 REPORT, supra note 49, at 8. Once competing trading nations begin to enter their own free
trade agreements with a potential partner, the United States would be at a disadvantage. This was
the primary reason the United States entered into the U.S.-Chile FTA. USTR noted that given
Chile’s other FTAs (with Canada, Mexico and the EU), Chile had reduced its purchases of U.S.
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bilateral free trade agreement negotiations and initiatives—Australia, Morocco,
CAFTA and SACU—began after consideration of the thirteen-factor list.54
Two years later, in 2004, the National Security Council55 (NSC) shortened the
list of factors to six criteria that should be used as guidelines for the
interagency process led by USTR, which chooses target countries. These six
factors—(1) country readiness, (2) economic and commercial benefit, (3)
benefits to the broader liberalization strategy, (4) compatibility with U.S.
interests, (5) congressional/private sector support and (6) U.S. government
resource constraints56—have been used for the more recent FTA agreements.
Even the narrowed list of criteria has been drawn broadly enough to allow
the U.S. administration great discretion in choosing FTA partners.57
Nevertheless, the actual choice of FTA partners reveals that some criteria
clearly have been weighed more heavily than others. Perceived and
anticipated congressional and private sector support is crucial for beginning
successful negotiations that will lead to the approval and implementation.
Since the Executive Branch cannot make trade policy independently, this
limitation actually poses a greater restraint on the United States than the
negotiating leverage of any FTA partner.58 Although Congress does not have a
exports by almost one-third. Id. at 42, 44 (noting that the United States lost export market share
in Chile due to its other FTAs).
54. Id. at 2, 11–12.
55. The NSC is on the highest tier interagency trade group that aids USTR. Id. at 4–5. The
NSC coordinates the views of the agencies regarding FTA partner selection. Id. at 7.
56. Id. at 9–10; GAO 2007 REPORT, supra note 45, at 12. According to USTR, the first
factor, country readiness, involves a “country’s political will, trade capabilities, and rule of law
systems.” GAO 2004 REPORT, supra note 49, at 9. The interagency review done to review FTA
partners means that different U.S. agencies examine different issues when evaluating a partner
under this factor. Id. at 9. USTR examines trade policy issues while the Treasury Department
looks at a potential FTA partner’s “overall macroeconomic stability and the strength of its
financial and banking systems.” Id.
The sixth factor, U.S. government constraints, deals primarily with the constraints at
USTR, such as its ability to staff negotiations. GAO 2004 REPORT, supra note 49, at 10. This
issue has become more pressing as the United States accelerated FTA negotiations to meet the
TPA time line for submission for Congress’s approval.
57. GAO 2007 REPORT, supra note 45, at 12.
58. Congress shares trade-making authority with the President under the Constitution. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8 cls. 1, 3 (Congress has the power to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and
Excises” and to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.”). Any trade agreement negotiated by
the President must be approved by Congress. In the modern era, this has meant that Congress
delegated its authority to the President to negotiate trade agreements and then return them for
approval. The process, called “fast track,” is so called because any trade agreement submitted to
Congress under this delegation will be voted on quickly and without amendment. See C. O’Neal
Taylor, Fast Track, Trade Policy, and Free Trade Agreements: Why the NAFTA Turned Into a
Battle, 28 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 1, 15–32 (1994) (providing a detailed history of the
fast track and the shared power relationship between Congress and the Executive). The most
recent version of fast track (renamed Trade Promotion Authority) was enacted in 2002, and it
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direct voice in the selection of FTA partners, it is not in the interest of any
administration to pursue a free trade agreement that will not garner the
necessary votes under the TPA.59 Congress guarantees that their approval will
be a large part of any decision on FTA partners through several mechanisms
either contained in the TPA or developed as standard practice. Congress
dictates the negotiating objectives the Executive must pursue in any regional
agreement.60 Congress requires notification before the commencement of
negotiations and consultation during the negotiations with the FTA partners,61
as well as post-negotiation consultations on areas of interest that can result in
alterations to negotiated and signed agreements.62 Congress also shares
drafting powers over the implementing legislation for each free trade
agreement with the Executive.
expired in 2007. All of the recent enacted and pending FTAs were negotiated under the terms of
the TPA.
59. See Esserman, supra note 35, at 15 (noting that the most important factor in selecting
which FTAs to negotiate has been the need to get the necessary votes in the House of
Representatives—“the need to secure 218 votes is the overriding determinant”). Both the House
and Senate vote on trade agreements, but with its power over the budget, it is the House vote that
comes first, which is, therefore, crucial. This also means that a trade agreement can become a
very political issue if it means potential loss of U.S. jobs through import competition. This was a
major factor in NAFTA and in DR-CAFTA. Id. at 17.
60. In the TPA of 2002, Congress identified pages for both overall trade negotiating
objectives and principal trade negotiating objectives. The principle trade negotiating objectives
were (1) trade barriers and distortions; (2) trade in services; (3) foreign investment; (4)
intellectual property; (5) transparency; (6) anti-corruption; (7) improvement of the WTO and
multilateral trade agreements; (8) regulatory practices; (9) electronic commerce; (10) reciprocal
trade in agriculture; (11) labor and the environment; (12) dispute settlement and enforcement;
(13) WTO extended negotiations; (14) trade remedy laws; (15) border taxes; (16) textile
negotiations; and (17) worst forms of child labor. TPA, supra note 28, at 994–1002.
61. Before negotiations, the President must notify Congress in writing of the intent to enter
into negotiations, consult both before and after with the principal Congressional Committees with
trade oversight (House Ways and Means and Senate Finance) and conduct consultations over
areas of special concerns—sensitive agricultural products, the fishing industry, and textiles. TPA,
supra note 28, at 1008–10. During negotiations and before entering into any free trade
agreements, the President must also consult with Congress and submit to Congress reports of the
private sector advisory committees (which review free trade agreement) and notify the
International Trade Commission (ITC) so that it can conduct an assessment of the agreement.
TPA, supra note 28, at 1010, 1012–13.
62. During this time frame, the President must submit to Congress a description of changes
that would be required to existing U.S. law, a final legal text of the agreement, draft of the
implementing legislation and a statement of administrative actions about the agreement. TPA,
supra note 28, at 1013. In practice, the President and Congress work together on the
implementing legislation. It is in this process that issues come up that are dealt with by side
agreements and side letters. See CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY
(TPA): ISSUES, OPTIONS, AND PROSPECTS FOR RENEWAL 13 (2007), available at
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl33743.pdf (noting that Congress insists on additions
or clarifications to trade agreements by this process).
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In order to meet these congressional expectations, USTR only negotiated
FTAs that have each congressional negotiating objective covered by a separate
standard chapter of the agreement.63 In addition to the need for congressional
support, several other major motivations underlie how the NSC criteria are
used. The most important of these motivations are (1) to pursue “competitive
liberalization”; (2) to satisfy particular foreign policy and objectives; (3) to
convert preference trading partners into reciprocal trade partners; and (4) to
push the well-developed U.S. agenda on deep integration issues.
“Competitive liberalization” is the preferred strategy for dealing with
lagging multilateral efforts. The strategy was developed to deal with a
multilateral system incapable of rapid movement. The WTO has a process of
consensus decision making in negotiating rounds and a much larger
membership (over 150 countries), including various coalitions of member
states pushing difficult agendas. Although the United States plays a leading
role in all negotiations, it cannot direct the agenda. Under the competitive
liberalization strategy, the United States pursues multiple free trade initiatives
simultaneously at the multilateral, regional and bilateral levels. Engaging fully
in levels other than the multilateral allows the United States to create “models
for success in areas” of trade negotiation and provides leverage with each new
agreement obtained.64 If trade liberalization proves unavailable or incomplete
at the multilateral level, successful competition from another level—much
easier to negotiate and complete—should spur greater progress or provide an
alternative.65 More recently, the United States has shifted to describing the
strategy as “complementary liberalization,” characterizing the multilateral and
regional efforts as mutually reinforcing ones.66
A simple review of the enacted and pending U.S. FTAs illustrates the
importance of the second motivation for the aggressive pursuit of
regionalism—to achieve foreign policy and national security objectives.67
63. GAO 2007 REPORT, supra note 45, at 18–19.
64. “Competitive liberalization” is the terminology adopted by former U.S. Trade
Representative Zoellick to describe the U.S. strategy.
“By pursuing multiple free trade initiatives, the United States has created a ‘competition
for liberalization,’ launching new global trade negotiations, providing leverage to spur new
negotiations and solve problems, and establishing models of success in areas such as intellectual
property, e-commerce, environment and labor and anti-corruption.” USTR, THE PRESIDENT’S
2005 TRADE POLICY AGENDA 1 (2005), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/
Reports_Publications/2005/2005_Trade_Policy_Agenda/Section_Index.html.
65. GAO 2007 REPORT, supra note 45, at 17.
66. Id.
67. Of the recent FTAs, three, those with Morocco, Bahrain and Omar, were negotiated with
foreign policy and national security as the dominant motivation. Id. at 1; GAO 2004 REPORT,
supra note 49, at 40 (noting the reason for choosing Bahrain was that it was an “important U.S.
ally in the region” and would support “U.S. security and political goals”); id. at 47 (describing
Morocco as “a staunch ally in the war against terrorism”).
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Following September 11, 2001, widespread consensus existed within the
Executive and Legislative Branches for pursuing closer relationships with
moderate Muslim countries. The MEFTA initiative, which began in 2003, and
the consequent bilaterals negotiated under it satisfy a key national security
concern. More particularized foreign policy goals are met by the choice of
Panama (security of the Canal Zone) and South Korea (to offset U.S. policy
towards N. Korea). Another explicit foreign policy concern is to encourage
countries—particularly the Andean countries overly reliant on the drug trade—
to refocus their economies. Another type of foreign policy goal has been to
encourage trade and governance reform in developing countries.
A third motivation has been to convert countries participating in preference
programs allowing duty-free access into the U.S. market—such as the General
System of Preferences (GSP), the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) and the
Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA)68—into countries offering the
reciprocal market access required in free trade agreements. For example, all of
the countries participating in DR-CAFTA as well as Peru, Panama and
Colombia have already or will relinquish preference status as part of negotiated
FTAs. All of these developing countries have relatively high tariff walls and
many other non-tariff barriers. Since any U.S.-negotiated FTA will cover
“substantially all trade,”69 the United States stands to gain complete access in
its developing partners’ market more fully and more quickly.70

68. The Generalized System of Preferences is the largest U.S. preference program—it allows
developing countries duty-free access to the U.S. market GSP for thousands of products from
over 100 designated beneficiary countries. USTR, A GUIDE TO THE U.S. GENERALIZED SYSTEM
OF PREFERENCES 3 (2006), available at http://regulations.justia.com/view/48713. The current
version, which has been enacted multiple times, expired at the end of 2008. The Caribbean Basis
Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), 19 U.S.C. § 2702 (2000), was first passed in 1983 and
expanded in 2000 and 2002 to help countries in the area access the U.S. market. 2008 TRADE
POLICY AGENDA, supra note 10, at 130. The Andean Trade Preference Act, Pub. L. No. 102-182,
105 Stat. 1233, 1236 (1991), was passed to aid the Andean countries in their efforts to develop
and spur regional economic development “to provide economic alternatives to the illegal drug
trade, promote domestic development, and thereby solidify democratic institutions.” 2008 TRADE
POLICY AGENDA, supra note 10, at 129.
69. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, art. XXIV(8)(b),
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187
(1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/06gatt.pdf (According to Article XXIV of the GATT, any free trade agreement must cover
“substantially all the trade.”).
70. U.S. free trade agreements are designed to eliminate tariffs on almost all trade between
the participating countries. By contrast, WTO members are committed in negotiating rounds only
to lowering tariffs and binding them. As a result, a developing country in a U.S. FTA would have
to work toward duty-free access for the United States but could keep fairly high tariffs to other
WTO members. The ability to exploit this difference—raising tariffs to the outside while not
doing so to an FTA partner—was used by Mexico to help it with the peso crisis that followed the
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A final, but no less important, motivation informing the choice of FTA
partners has been to push the U.S. agenda on deep integration issues. The
United States pioneered the concept of adding new subjects and rules to free
trade agreements with the U.S.-Canada FTA and NAFTA and has pursued
such a model ever since. With limited exceptions, all U.S. FTAs require
comprehensive trade in services coverage, extensive protection of intellectual
property rights and government procurement. By including the first two areas
and expanding their reach in each, the United States extends gains achieved in
the Uruguay Round,71 when both areas were placed under WTO jurisdiction.
By contrast, the inclusion of government procurement as a covered FTA
subject allows the United States to obtain much greater market access to a
large amount of trade currently available under the WTO rules.72 The U.S.
model FTA also covers issues that have been rejected or resisted by the WTO.
Almost every U.S. FTA contains chapters on investment rights (including
neutral arbitration to protect such rights),73 and most cover competition law.74

adoption of NAFTA. BHAGWATI, THE WIND OF THE HUNDRED DAYS, supra note 31, at 231–32
(expressing skepticism about the idea that PTAs “lock in” trade reform).
The tariffs in a free trade agreement are phased out over time in U.S. agreements from
immediate elimination up to twenty years. The United States, however, always negotiates
agreements so that as large a proportion possible of trade is duty-free prior to ten years. For
example, the United States was able to set that 85% of all trade be freed up immediately and 90%
of all trade within four years of the entry into force of the U.S.-Chile FTA. U.S. INT’L TRADE
COMMISSION (ITC), PUB. NO. 3780, THE IMPACT OF TRADE AGREEMENTS IMPLEMENTED
UNDER TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY 2–12 (2005) [hereinafter ITC IMPACT REPORT].
By contrast, recent WTO negotiating rounds take years to complete. The Uruguay
Round took from eight years (1986–1994), while the Doha Round is in year seven (2001–present)
without any indication of an end date.
71. The United States led the push to get trade services and intellectual property onto the
Uruguay Round agenda against the opposition of developing countries. See Taylor, supra note
31, at 220–37. When the Uruguay Round ended, the World Trade Organization had been created
and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and Trade-Related Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) were made part of the obligations of all members. General Agreement on Trade
in Services, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 108
Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS], available
at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_e.pdf; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1C , 108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 269, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1125
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]; available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf.
72. The Agreement on Government Procurement is a plurilateral agreement of the WTO.
Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 4(b), 19 U.N.T.S. 103, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gpr-94_e.pdf. Member states can choose
whether or not to accede to the agreement. As a result, it has a much smaller membership,
approximately 40 countries as opposed to the 150 Members of the WTO.
73. Every recent U.S. FTA, except for those with Jordan, Australia and Bahrain, cover
investment. See U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 10. The United States and Jordan concluded a
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Each of these FTA chapters cover the areas of greatest U.S. comparative
advantage (trade in services, creation of intellectual property thus benefiting
from IP rights, investment capacity), is built around U.S.-level standards (IP
rights,75 investment rights, government procurement procedures), or both.
Why do developing countries pursue regional agreements with the United
States? In the last two decades, it has become clear that regionalism accounts
for a growing portion of world trade.76 No developing country seeking
economic growth and development can stay outside this major pattern of world
trade. Virtually every member of the WTO is a member of one or more
regional agreements.77 Consequently, the first rationale for seeking a regional
agreement is to avoid isolation and to enter or ease entry problems with
globalization.78
The second major rationale is more obvious but no less important. Many
of the agreements developing countries pursue are truly within their own
geographic region and constitute a necessary attempt to build on and increase
traditional trade and investment flows. If the closest countries are other
developing countries, they enter South-South agreements to build greater
strength and efficiency as a group. If the major market of the developing
country is a developed market such as the United States, however, that country
becomes the logical FTA partner. Most of the developing countries that have
completed an FTA already have the United States as their major export
market.79 Each of these countries, therefore, has had the chance to analyze the
actual benefits and costs of a U.S. FTA entered into by a country with similar
Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) in 1997 that entered into force in 2003. Bahrain had entered
into a BIT with the United States prior to the FTA. The U.S.-Australia FTA lacks mandatory
investor-state arbitration but does contain standards for the treatment of investors. See U.S.Australia FTA, supra note 10.
74. Competition law chapters have not been included in all recent agreements. There are no
chapters on this subject area in the FTAs with Jordan, Morocco, DR-CAFTA, Bahrain, Oman and
Panama.
75. See infra notes 128–135 and accompanying text for a discussion on how the United
States pushes for an intellectual property chapter built on U.S. standards.
76. Regionalism now accounts for over 50% of world trade. UNCTAD, MULTILATERALISM
AND REGIONALISM: THE NEW INTERFACE, UNCTAD/DITC/TNCD/2004/7, at 3 (2005),
available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditctncd20047_en.pdf.
77. According to the WTO, every member state except Mongolia is a member of a regional
trade arrangement. World Trade Report 2007, supra note 14, at 34.
78. Trade and Development Report, 2007, supra note 6, at 38.
79. This is true for all of the U.S. FTAs with countries in Latin America. These countries
send a far greater proportion of their exports to the United States than to one another—only
13.2% of Latin exports went to other Latin American countries. Nathalie Aminican, K.C. Fung &
Francis Ng, Integration of Markets vs. Integration by Agreements 19–21 (The World Bank
Development Research Group Trade Team Policy Research, Working Paper No. 4546 , 2008),
available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2008/
03/04/000158349_20080304084358/Rendered/PDF/wps4546.pdf.
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goals and constraints. In this sense, Mexico’s experience with the United
States in NAFTA has provided a model for other developing countries to
study.80
The United States is the world’s largest market. Most developing
countries already have what appears to be access to this market through
relatively low tariffs and highly developed preference programs. But this
market access is neither complete—not every export of interest to all
developing countries are covered by low tariffs or preference programs—nor
secure since all preference programs have to be renewed periodically and are
always altered upon renewal. By entering into a permanent FTA with the
United States,81 the developing countries gain secure and true duty-free access.
In its most recent FTAs, the United States has front-loaded its own tariff
phase-outs in industrial goods and many agricultural goods as well to put
developing countries in a position to benefit early from signing on to an FTA.82
Developing countries that act early to form an FTA with a developed country
may also obtain first-mover benefits.83 In the case of U.S. FTAs, this means

80. Mexico does provide a model of what can happen to a developing country entering into a
free trade agreement with a major developed trading nation. Mexico has clearly seen increase in
trade and investment flows. Without NAFTA, Mexico’s global exports would have been 25%
lower and investment levels would have been 40% lower. DANIEL LEDERMAN, WILLIAM F.
MALONEY & LUIS SERVEN, LESSONS FROM NAFTA FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE
CARRIBBEAN COUNTRIES 5 (The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The
World Bank, eds., Stanford University Press 2005) [hereinafter LESSONS FROM NAFTA],
available at http://ctrc.sice.oas.org/geograph/north/lessonsNAFTA_e.pdf. Nevertheless, it is
clear that Mexico has not shown the economic growth expected from NAFTA nor as fast as other
Latin American Countries without an FTA. Id. at vi. See infra at notes 84–91 and accompanying
text for a more complete discussion of issues related to Mexico’s experience under NAFTA. See
also Ranko Shakri Oliver, In the Twelve Years of NAFTA, the Treaty Gave to Me . . . What,
Exactly?: An Assessment of the Economic, Social and Political Development in Mexico Since
1994 and their Impact on Mexican Immigration into the United States, 10 HARV. LATINO L. REV
53, 57 (2007) (pointing out the need to study NAFTA and its effects on Mexico because it is the
prototype for other agreements within countries in the Western Hemisphere at a similar level of
development).
81. Every U.S. FTA provides the parties with the right to withdraw from the agreement
within six months if it provides notice of withdraw to the other parties. See NAFTA, supra note
22, art. 2205. However, it would be quite costly for parties to withdrawal, and that option has
never been seriously considered by any FTA partner.
82. For illustrations, see the recent FTA with DR-CAFTA—more than 90% of trade in
consumer and industrial goods and half of the agricultural trade were liberalized early. DRCAFTA, supra note 10.
83. This was widely perceived to be the case of Mexico in NAFTA. See Global Economic
Prospects, Trade, Regionalism and Development (The World Bank, Washington, D.C. 2005),
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGEP2005/Resources/gep2005.pdf. In the case
of DR-CAFTA, the countries negotiated over the rules of origin to set the most flexible market
access conditions available in the textiles sector,one that is still relatively restricted. Central
America Dept. and Office of the Chief Economist Latin America and Carribbean Region, DR-
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negotiating special rules of origin for products of interest to the developing
country or group that will give it a preferential position over other developing
countries trying to enter the U.S. market.
The third major objective of the developing country is to attract more
foreign direct investment. Signing on to major investment rights and providing
the assurance of neutral arbitration regarding any infringement of those rights
signals to investors that a country is a credible and secure investment target.
One of the major consequences of NAFTA for Mexico was a great increase in
investment flows.84 Developing countries looking to attract a greater share of
investment hope to duplicate this pattern by acceding to a U.S.-style FTA, just
as they have by signing BITs with the United States, the EC and Japan.85 One
aspect of the investment chapters in the U.S. FTAs provides an additional
incentive for developing countries to pursue the agreement. In each chapter,
“investment” is defined to cover all investments made in the FTA party
regardless of the country of origin of the investor. Although barred from
benefits under trade provisions of the FTA, non-member country firms can
take advantage of the investment protections and investment arbitration by
investing in a party to the free trade agreement.
The fourth motivation for negotiating and implementing an FTA is to “lock
in” domestic reforms in the areas of trade and investment policy and
governance.86 Many countries that are developing have undertaken unilateral
or regional trade investment liberalization before entering into an FTA with the
United States. A clear example is the reform efforts undertaken throughout
Latin America in the last fifteen years.87 Such reforms, however, may not be
permanent. Succeeding political regimes sometimes have overturned reform

CAFTA: Challenges and Opportunities for Central America 39–41 [hereinafter DR-CAFTA
Report], available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/LACEXT/Resources/258553-11196487
63980/DR_CAFTA_Challenges_Opport_Final_en.pdf.
84. See infra at note 159 and accompanying text.
85. See generally Andeas Lowenfeld, Investment Agreements and International Law, 42
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 123, 126 (2003) (discussing the rationales for entering BITs); Jeswald
W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral
Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L. J. 67, 77 (2005) (describing the
bargain as “a promise of protection in return for the prospect of more capital in the future” and
explaining that the study reveals the bargain has worked).
86. One of the major motivations for Mexico entering NAFTA was to “lock in” domestic
reforms it had made in the investment and intellectual property rights. In DR-CAFTA, the
countries were seeking that same benefit. DR-CAFTA Report, supra note 83, at 29–32 (“For
many Central American nations, locking many of the reforms of recent years with an FTA that is
costly to violate should generate a credibility effect that could boost investment levels.”).
87. All of the DR-CAFTA countries engaged in trade reform during this period, lowering
tariffs and some developed a maquila industry aimed at the United States. One of the goals of the
FTA was to build on the reform because it would guarantee long-term market access to the
United States and lock in its reforms. Id.
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legislation and have withdrawn from regional arrangements.88 Withdrawal
from a U.S. FTA is possible but unlikely. The benefits from the agreement, as
well the close contact established with the United States to consolidate those
benefits, make withdrawal too costly.89 If negotiations last long enough, the
developing country might have time to adapt its domestic legislation in certain
regulatory areas to correspond to FTA requirements—thus easing the
adjustment process—before the FTA enters into force. Mexico, for instance,
used the NAFTA negotiations process to not only lock in pro-market reforms
but to pass major legislation reforming its investment and intellectual property
laws.90
A final motivation for entering an FTA with the United States is that it
may spur or assist with other integration efforts. Organizing a regional
integration movement among developing countries may be a crucial step in
aiding a country’s economic growth. However, such South-South agreements
frequently fail, due to difficulties in implementation, to provide as much
liberalization or opportunity for growth as expected.91 By entering into a U.S.
FTA, the developing country and its group have a target for the group’s trade
expansion that would make efforts worthwhile.
III. WHAT KIND OF REGIONALISM?
The U.S. answer to the question of what type of regionalism is easy to
explain. The United States only enters into free trade agreements that satisfy
its model. The free trade agreement is the U.S.-favored form of regionalism
for three reasons. First, there are only limited multilateral requirements for
free trade agreements, and these are relatively easy to satisfy. Second, setting
up a free trade area requires only the most limited level of integration with
FTA partners. Third, the combination of the limited legal rules and the limited

88. Most recently, the Andean Community, a customs union, broke apart after two members,
Peru and Colombia, negotiated FTAs with the United States. Under the terms of the regional
arrangement, these countries had the right to negotiate independently with third-party countries,
regions or international organizations. Nevertheless, when the two countries went ahead with the
negotiations, Venezuela withdrew from the group and joined MERCOSUR. See Chris Brummer,
The Ties that Bind? Regionalism, Commercial Treaties, and the Future of Global Economic
Integration, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1349, 1380–81, 1384–86 (2007).
89. Every U.S. FTA sets up a committee structure for the operation of the agreement. The
FTA committees meet on a regular basis to resolve issues regarding implementation of the tariff
phase-outs, standards issues and, in recent FTAs, trade capacity building.
90. Mexico’s investment law was revised in 1993. Its revised intellectual property law was
enacted in 1991—both prior to the entry into force of NAFTA.
91. See Trade and Development Report, 2007, supra note 6, at 110–11 for a discussion of
South-South agreements and how they should be used. See also Globalization for Development,
supra note 11, at 8.
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level of required integration allows the United States the greatest flexibility
and control in designing the agreement and its contents.
In order to comply with the WTO, members should enter into only those
free trade agreements that satisfy the requirements under GATT Article XXIV:
(1) to eliminate duties and other restrictive regulations on substantially all trade
between constituent territories originating in those territories; (2) not to raise
duties or other restrictive regulations against non-members upon formation of
the free trade area; and (3) to achieve these objectives within a reasonable
period of time.92 There are similar requirements regarding agreements on trade
in services under GATS Article V.93 The requirements under both legal rules

92. GATT 1994, supra note 69, art. XXIV, ¶ 5(b).
With respect to a free-trade area . . . the duties and other regulations of commerce
maintained in each of the constituent territories and applicable at the formation of such
free-trade area . . . shall not be higher or more restrictive than the corresponding duties
and other regulations of commerce existing in the same constituent territories prior to the
formation of the free-trade area.
Id.
(8) For purposes of this Agreement:
....
(b) a free-trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or more customs
territories in which the duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce ... are
eliminated on substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in products
originating in such territories.
Id. art. XXIV, ¶ 8(b). Article XXIV, thus, intended to allow regional arrangements “as long as
they satisfied three requirements: transparency, commitment to deep—intra regional
liberalization, and neutrality vis-à-vis third parties.” World Trade Report 2007, supra note 14, at
305.
93. GATS, supra note 71, art. V:
1. This Agreement shall not prevent any of its Members from being a party to or
entering into an agreement liberalizing trade in services between or among the parties
to such an agreement, provided that such an agreement:
(a) has substantial sectoral coverage(1), and
(b) provides for the presence or elimination of substantially all discrimination, in
the sense of Article XVII, between or among the parties, in the sectors covered
under subparagraph (a), through:
(i) elimination of existing discriminatory measures, and/or
(ii) prohibition of new or more discriminatory measures.
Either at the entry into force of that agreement or on the basis of a reasonable time-frame, except
for measures permitted under Articles XI, XII and XIV.
2. In evaluating whether the conditions under paragraph 1(b) are met, consideration
may be given to the relationship of the agreement to a wider process of economic
integration or trade liberalization among the countries concerned.
(a) Where developing countries are parties to an agreement of the type referred to
in paragraph 1, flexibility shall be provided for regarding the conditions set out in
paragraph 1, particularly with reference to subparagraph (b) thereof, in accordance
with the level of development of the countries concerned, both overall and in
individual sectors and subsectors.
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have proven relatively easy to satisfy in part because of the WTO’s failure to
provide interpretations to the meaning of such crucial terms as “duties and
other restrictive regulations” and “substantially all trade” in Article XXIV and
“substantially all discrimination” in GATS Art. V.94 All U.S. FTAs aim to
eliminate restrictions on all trade95 and to cover as many service sectors
possible. The second requirement only demands that the parties not raise
barriers to non-members when the free trade agreement is formed and is,
therefore, easily satisfied. The third requirement of compliance within a
“reasonable time” was interpreted by the WTO to mean that any free trade
agreement be implemented no more than ten years except for “exceptional
cases.”96 U.S. FTAs with developing countries probably satisfy the ten-year
requirement since most restrictions are phased out by that time.97 Should there
ever be true scrutiny of free trade agreements by the WTO, however, the much
longer time frames for the FTAs could be justified as offering consideration for
the needs of developing countries. Given the GATT/WTO history of not
disapproving regional arrangements,98 it has been easy for the United States to
comply with the structure of free trade areas demanded by Article XXIV and
GATS V.

The major elements of GATS Art. V are (1) “substantial sectoral coverage” of the trade services
among the parties; (2) that “substantially all discrimination has to be eliminated either at entry
into force or on a “reasonable time-frame” and (3) that the agreement area not raise the overall
level of barriers compared to before the formation of the economic integration area. World Trade
Report 2007, supra note 14, at 307.
94. See id. at 308–312 for a discussion of the GATT Art. XXIV and GATS Art. V elements
which have not been fully defined and how they might be interpreted.
95. See DR-CAFTA, supra note 10, ch. 3, Annex 3.3. See also USTR, DR-CAFTA FACTS:
FREE TRADE WITH CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC HIGHLIGHTS OF THE
CAFTA, CAFTA POLICY BRIEF (Feb. 2005), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_
Agreements/Regional/CAFTA/Briefing_Book/asset_upload_file74_7284.pdf. See also U.S.-Peru
FTA, supra note 10, at ch. 2, Annex 2.3.
96. Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement Tariffs
and Trade 1994 provides: “The ‘reasonable length of time’ referred to in paragraph 5(c) of Art.
XXIV should exceed 10 years only in exceptional cases.” There is no clear consensus in the
WTO about what constitutes an “exceptional case.” World Trade Report 2007, supra note 14, at
310. There is a similar lack of consensus on what a “reasonable time-frame” for complying with
GATS V means. U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 10, ch. 2, Annex 2.3.
97. The recent U.S. FTAs with developing countries have tariff phase outs that go on for 15,
17 or 20 years. The long time frames are reserved for import sensitive products, usually
agricultural goods. Industrial goods are always phased out by year ten of each agreement.
NAFTA was negotiated before the Art. XXIV Understanding and phases out tariff
elimination over fifteen years. See NAFTA, supra note 22, art. 302. In this respect, the U.S.
FTAs match many other FTAs, where the common pattern is for 90% of most imports to be dutyfree by the tenth year of implementation. World Trade Report 2007, supra note 14, at 309.
98. See supra text accompanying note 13 for a discussion of the GATT/WTO oversight of
this issue.
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In order to establish a free trade area, the parties concentrate on eliminating
barriers to each other. This requires designing rules to ensure that only the
FTA parties actually benefit from the removal of those barriers—the crucial
Rules of Origin.99 These rules can easily be negotiated as part of the
agreement. Unlike the customs union, in which parties must create a common
external tariff and therefore trade policy, FTA partners do not need to establish
a legislative institution within the FTA to achieve this goal. Rather, each
country can implement its FTA obligations while largely retaining its own
respective trade policymaking regime. This aspect of free trade areas meets
the U.S. preference for limited institutionalism and retention of as much
sovereignty as possible. During the U.S.-Canada negotiating process, for
example, the United States completely resisted a push for the possibility of
achieving common legislation in unfair trade rules and pushed instead for a
dispute settlement mechanism that would review each country’s appreciation
of its own law.
The third reason the United States prefers free trade areas is the flexibility
allowed by the form. One preference has been to, if possible, accommodate
regionalism with the long-held U.S. commitment to multilateralism as the best
form for trade liberalization. All U.S. FTAs are, therefore, built around GATT
compliance and core GATT concepts. The other preference—unilateral in
nature—has been to use regionalism to keep pushing the U.S. agenda on legal
disciplines even if the multilateralism system is not ready or unwilling to
accommodate those rules.100
The U.S. model FTA reflects all of these U.S. goals—GATT compliance
and consistency, limited institutionalism and moving the rules agenda forward.
The development of the model began with the U.S.-Canada Free Trade
Agreement, the first free trade agreement to include trade in services and
investment. However, all of the major components of the basic model really
came together in NAFTA. The continued use of the model can be traced to

99. Rules of Origin are crucial for a free trade area because they specify which products are
entitled to duty-free treatment. NAFTA established the set of basic rules of origin still used in
U.S. trade FTAs. These rules are widely regarded as complex. See Jorge Alberto Ramirez, Rules
of Origin: NAFTA's Heart, But FTAA's Heartburn, 29 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 617, 641–42 (2004) for
a short description of how the rules operate. The rules, which are negotiated specifically for
many products, actually comprise the greatest part of any U.S. FTA. The NAFTA model
provides for a high degree of variation across product categories. This type of variation is what
allows sectoral interest groups (i.e., industry groups) to shape the rules to protect certain areas of
trade.
100. One example of an area of U.S. interest is extending multilateral discipline over
investment. Although investment was part of the Doha Agenda, the WTO General Council
withdrew the topic from the negotiations agenda in 2004. Trade and Development Report 2007,
supra note 6, at 11. Free trade agreement negotiations, however, remain a way for the United
States to keep the issue alive.
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several factors. The first and most obvious is the issue of power. Apart from
Canada, the United States has never had to negotiate with a trading partner of
close or equal bargaining power. All of the post-NAFTA FTAs, except for
Australia, have been with developing countries. The resulting asymmetry in
bargaining power allows the United States not only to offer the model as a
template for negotiations, but also to insist on adherence to most of its
components.
Power dynamics, however, are not only the factor in play. The model has
proven its utility. The flexibility of the form allows the United States to go
beyond trade in goods and services to include investment and other issues,
such as intellectual property rights, or add new chapters on trade areas that
developed after NAFTA. The format also leaves room for particularized
negotiations with partners over including or excluding some subject matter
areas, how to treat special sectors or products, regulatory limitations and
capacity constraints.101 At the same time, use of the model allows for freezing
the language on key concepts because the United States and other FTA
partners know what they mean. Meanwhile, actual working experience under
the FTAs, developed through the subject matters committees established in
NAFTA,102 as well as dispute settlement interpretations103 has led the United
States and other FTA partners to renegotiate and rework the standard text.104

101. Particularized negotiations are always required in trade for goods on special rules of
origin and tariff phase-outs. For an analysis of those in DR-CAFTA, see DR-CAFTA Report,
supra note 83, at 34–41. In U.S. FTAs, there are always several chapters on services because
liberalization in those chapters is not just about eliminating barriers, but also about dealing with
regulatory structures. Each FTA partner must retain as much regulatory oversight as necessary to
guarantee services to its population. As a result, the services chapters make explicit government
powers to regulate. For an illustration of the importance of regulatory oversight, see DRCAFTA, supra note 10, art. 12.10.
102. All U.S. FTAs create a Free Trade Commission comprised of the trade ministers of the
participating parties. The actual work of the agreements is done in sub-committees and working
groups established for various subject matter area commitments. For an illustration, see DRCAFTA, supra note 10, art. 19.1(3) (giving the Free Trade Commission authority to delegate
subcommittees and working groups power to modify the tariff phase-out schedule, common
guidelines on tariffs and government procurement matters). See also U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note
10, ch. 20.1.
103. The U.S. experience with investor-state arbitration has led to a significant revision of
two major provisions of Chapter 11, Minimum Standard of Treatment (Art. 1105) and
Expropriation (Art. 1110). For an analysis of how the results in Chapter 11 arbitrations altered
the investment chapter model FTA, see Meg Kinnear & Robin Hansen, The Influence of Chapter
11 in the BIT Landscape, 12 U.C. DAVIS INT’L L & POL’Y 101, 106–112 (2005). See also David
A. Gantz, The Evolution of FTA Investment Provisions from NAFTA to the United States-Chile
Free Trade Agreement, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 679, 683 (2004).
104. Core provisions of Chapter 11 have been renegotiated and redrafted to clarify the
meaning of concepts. Compare NAFTA, supra note 22, ch. 11 (arts. 1105, 1110), with U.S.-Peru
FTA, supra note 10, at ch. 11 (arts. 1105, 1110, Annexes 10-A, 10-B).
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The use of the model also allows the United States to negotiate more
efficiently. By using the same template of issues to cover and the same
agreement, the United States does not have to expend negotiating resources on
designing an agreement with each FTA partner from the ground up. Instead,
the United States can concentrate on negotiating areas of each FTA that require
alteration or compromise.
The United States has employed two models in its FTAs: the NAFTA
model and the WTO-plus model. The shift to the WTO-plus model,
characterized by requiring its FTA partners to make additional commitments
on several key subject matter areas, occurred after the United States
encountered difficulties in the FTAA negotiations and in the Doha Round.
Although it expands on some requirements, the WTO-plus model shares the
same basic design and core substantive obligations as the NAFTA model.
The design of the FTAs is one of the most consistent aspects of U.S. FTAs.
With the notable exception of the U.S.-Jordan FTA,105 all of the U.S. FTAs are
heavily drafted documents comprised of approximately sixteen subject areas
and chapters (with others devoted to institutional matters)106 that run for
hundreds of pages.
The first chapter of the FTA is devoted to the objectives of the agreement
and general definitions. The first article in the model always declares the
intention of the parties—consistent with GATT Article XXIV—to establish a
free trade area.107 All of the subject matter chapters exhibit the same structure
by beginning with either definitions or general obligations regarding the
subject and ending with detailed annexes containing exceptions and

Investor-state arbitrations may also have been one of the reasons why some recent FTAs
do not contain competition chapters. D. Daniel Sokol, Order Without (Enforceable) Law: Why
Countries Enter into Non-Enforceable Competition Policy Chapters in Free Trade Agreements,
83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 231, 274 (2008). There are no competition chapters in the recent DRCAFTA, Morocco or Bahrain FTAs. According to Sokol, the United States is not the country
pushing for such chapters. “The United States position may be best described as one that does
not oppose competition policy chapters as long as the chapters remain non-binding and the FTA
counter-party finds the inclusion of such a chapter to be important.” Id. at 258–59.
105. The U.S.-Jordan FTA is the only FTA that is not heavily drafted—it is only twenty pages
long. See U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 10.
106. The ITC reviewed the first comprehensive FTAs based on the NAFTA model in a report
in 2005. According to its analysis the model FTA consists of twenty to twenty-four chapters, all
organized in the same order in all of the agreements, with annexes (to address non-conforming
measures with regard to services), sometimes containing separate chapters on specific industry
sectors or regulatory issues. ITC IMPACT REPORT, supra note 70, at 2-2 tbl. 2.1 (comparing the
structure/contents Singapore, Chile and Morocco agreements on a grid).
107. For an illustration, see KORUS, supra note 10, art. 1.1 (“Consistent with Article XXIV
of GATT 1994 and Article V of GATS, the Parties hereby establish a free trade area in
accordance with the provisions of this Agreement.”)
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reservations, or special forms of implementation for the general rules.108 The
FTAs also tend to have side letters that are considered to be part of the text.109
These letters have been developed, unlike the reservations and exceptions, in
response to congressional demands made during the implementation process.
The model adopts core GATT trade concepts—most favored nation and
national treatment—in the chapters on trade in goods and services. Rather than
simply borrowing the language of the relevant GATT article, the model
requires the parties to follow the GATT or GATS concept itself, including later
interpretations.110 The General Exceptions chapter uses GATT similarly,
requiring the parties to incorporate Article XI.111 This drafting decision serves
several purposes. It acts to signal general adherence to GATT discipline by
underscoring NAFTA’s consistency with its major agreements. The adoption
of GATT/GATS rules also aids in the later interpretation of the relevant FTA
provision. Since GATT (and, where applicable, GATS) is incorporated, each
FTA partner has the option of pursuing an FTA violation based on the
provision in the WTO or the FTA itself.112 Consequently, whichever forum is
chosen, there should be consistent interpretation of the concept.113 The choice
108. Chapters are built around general obligations. In order to understand what a partner
country has agreed to, the annexes are the place to look.
109. All U.S. FTAs have side letters but not all side letters are the same. Some are “records
of understanding while others can amount to agreed upon interpretations that can add to or make
effective changes.” ITC IMPACT REPORT, supra note 70, at 2–6.
110. In NAFTA, this technique was used with key GATT concepts—national treatment and
the prohibition on quantitative restrictions. With respect to national treatment, for example,
NAFTA provides:
Each party shall accord national treatment to goods of another Party in accordance with
Article III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), including its
interpretive notes, or any equivalent provision of a successor agreement to which all
Parties are a party, are incorporated into and made part of this Agreement.
NAFTA, supra note 22, art. 301.
After the completion of the Uruguay Round, which adopted GATT in 1994, the language was
changed for all later FTAs. Compare NAFTA, supra note 22, art. 301 with DR-CAFTA, supra
note 10, on National Treatment:
Each party shall accord national treatment to the goods of another Party in accordance
with Article III of the GATT 1994, including its interpretive notes, and to this end Article
III of GATT 1994 and its interpretive notes are incorporated into and made part of this
Agreement, mutatis mutandis.
DR-CAFTA, supra note 10, art 3.2.
111. Compare DR-CAFTA, supra note 10, art. 3.8 with NAFTA, supra note 22, art. 309(1).
112. All FTAs have a choice of forum provision in the chapter on dispute settlement.
Compare DR-CAFTA, supra note 10, art. 20.3 with NAFTA, supra note 22, art. 2005(1). In DRCAFTA, the choice of forum extends to yet another regional agreement dispute settlement system
to cover disputes arising between two of the DR-CAFTA members which are members of another
regional agreement.
113. There is no concept of precedent in international law. However, both NAFTA panels
and WTO panels have relied greatly on earlier interpretations by dispute settlement panels.
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of forum provision was actually inserted into NAFTA when it was drafted,
even though at the time the Uruguay Round had not yet finished and the
WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) had not been adopted. Had
the Uruguay Round failed, NAFTA parties would have had only the choice of
the old GATT Article XXIII dispute settlement system114 or the non-binding
arbitration provided for in NAFTA Chapter 20.115 The later availability of the
DSU, with its enforcement mechanism,116 has resulted in both the United
States and its FTA partners in frequently choosing the WTO for resolving
disputes.117
Other notable recurring aspects in the commitment chapters are those
dealing with certain substantive obligations. The Trade in Goods part of the
model FTA is built around three main features.118 Tariff elimination is always
phased in, going from the date of enactment to five years, ten years or beyond.
The percentage of trade covered by the phase-outs is adjusted for each FTA
partner according to its market strength or competitiveness.119 The most

114. The GATT Article XXIII dispute settlement system required GATT adoption of any
panel decision and allowed the losing party to block the adoption of the report. The United States
was so concerned about the inadequacies of the GATT system that it pushed for adoption of a
new dispute settlement system during the Uruguay Round. For a thorough review of the U.S.
position on this issue, see Taylor, supra note 31, at 242–250.
115. Under NAFTA Article 2018, the parties to the dispute actually determine its outcome.
Article 2018 provides: “On receipt of the final report of a panel, the disputing Parties shall agree
on the resolution of the dispute, which normally shall conform with the determinations and
recommendations of the panel, and shall notify their Sections of the Secretariat of any agreed
resolution of any dispute.” NAFTA, supra note 22, at art. 2018(1). Cf. U.S.-Peru FTA, supra
note 10, art. 21.15 (which simplifies the language but has the same non-binding effect).
116. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 33 I.L.M. 1125–1226
(1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm.
117. The United States has pursued most of its major trade complaints against Canada in the
WTO’s DSU system: Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals (DS 31), Measures Affecting the
Importation of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy Products (DS 103). Canada has done the same
with major complaints: Certain Measures Affecting the Import of Cattle, Swine and Grain (DS
144), Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (DS 234), Dispute with Respect to
Certain Softwood Lumber (DS 236, 247, 257, 264, 277, 311), Subsidies and Other Domestic
Support for Corn and Other Agricultural Products (357). The same pattern has been true for the
United States and Mexico. WTO, Dispute Settlement: Disputes by Country, http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm.
118. In NAFTA, the part on trade in goods (Part II) always covers both Market Access and
National Treatment. This is true for all later U.S. FTAs as well. Included in the part are also
special provisions related to sensitive sectors of trade. See NAFTA, supra note 22, pt. 2. In later
agreements, there are often breakouts of some of these provisions for separate chapters. See U.S.Peru FTA, supra note 10, chs. 2, 3.
119. The United States first encountered the issue of how to balance obligations on tariff
elimination—the single biggest factor towards opening up trade in goods—when it negotiated
with Mexico during NAFTA. Mexico took great efforts to make the United States understand its
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sensitive products for both parties are always back-loaded in this phase-out,
thereby giving each partner the opportunity to obtain the best possible
adjustment for the affected industry. A separate chapter is usually reserved for
agriculture, the least-disciplined area of trade. The agricultural trade chapter
allows the parties to retain trade policies eliminated in the other trade-in-goods
chapters tariffs, quotas and tariff-rate quotas.
Core chapters are also included on Rules of Origin and on Customs
Administration. Both chapters cover key aspects of the actual operation of a
free trade area, and each chapter addresses obligations placed not only on the
parties but also on citizens. The Rules of Origin specify which goods are
entitled to duty-free treatment. The Customs Administration obligations
require implementation obligations for the FTA partner about how to provide
assistance to traders and enforcement with regard to the rules of origin. The
NAFTA model established the pattern of having general, quite restrictive rules
of origin as well as special rules of origin for selected sectors of interest to the
FTA partners.120 Of particular relevance to developing countries are the
special rules of origin for textiles and clothing.121
In the chapter(s) on trade in services, the NAFTA model uses the negative
list approach. This means that the overall obligations to liberalize and to
provide non-discriminatory treatment with regard to regulations apply to all
service sectors except those reserved at the time of negotiations and reflected
in the annexes.122

status as a developing country and the adjustments it would have to make. HERMANN VON
BERTRAB, NEOGIATING NAFTA: A MEXICAN ENVOY’S ACCOUNT 46 (1997).
120. These restrictive Rules of Origin are a well-recognized and entrenched aspect of the U.S.
model.
121. In recent U.S. FTAs with Latin American countries, these chapters are crucial. Since the
textile sector is still relatively undisciplined, like agriculture, a U.S. FTA partner must try to
negotiate provisions that will allow the greatest market access possible. The textile rules receive
extended treatment in DR-CAFTA. In DR-CAFTA, the United States did agree to phase out all
remaining multilateral quotas but obtained a special safeguards measure for textile imports. The
parties also agreed to special customs cooperation procedures to aid in dealing with rule of origin
issues. See DR-CAFTA, supra note 10, arts. 3.22, 3.23 and 3.24.
122. This is completely different from the GATS “positive list” approach, in which a service
sector is not covered unless clearly specified. Use of the negative list approach does force greater
liberalization of services and locks in prior liberalization by an FTA partner. The use of the
negative list approach also means that any new service will automatically be covered by the
agreement. Finally, even though an FTA partner can take exceptions (keep non-conforming
measures) by designating them as such and including them in the agreement, if they later
liberalize a non-conforming measure, that measure becomes “bound” and must be continued.
ITC IMPACT REPORT, supra note 70, at 2–14. The non-conforming measures or exceptions taken
by each FTA party are attached as Annexes to the FTA.
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The other standard commitment chapters are on investment,123 intellectual
property rights,124 government procurement,125 competition policy, standards
(sanitary and phytosanitary and technical barriers to trade),126 labor rights and
environmental cooperation.127 Not all of these standard chapters originated in
the same way. The investment chapter entered the model from the U.S.Canada FTA but took its final form in NAFTA with the addition of
investor/host state arbitration. The services, intellectual property and standards
chapters were drafted before completion of the WTO’s corresponding chapters.
Undoubtedly, the Uruguay Round drafts were used as models for each. At the
time they were completed and NAFTA went into force, it was not clear that the
Uruguay Round would complete and so each chapter became important as an
illustration of how agreements on these issues could be reached between
developed and developing countries. The labor and environmental chapters,
which began in NAFTA as side agreements, were negotiated in response to a
new political regime in the United States—with the election of President
Clinton—and by the need to obtain the approval of a Congress that had shifted
in composition from the start of negotiations.
The evolution to the WTO-plus model is easy to trace in several of these
commitment chapters. The chapter on intellectual property offers the best
illustration of the shift. The structure of the NAFTA model has been retained.
Each IP chapter begins with general obligations: to adhere to specified
multilateral IP agreements and the right to offer more extensive protection than
that specified in the agreement.128 Consequently, the FTA provisions on
123. The U.S. FTA chapters on investment cover investor rights and protections in Part A and
provide for binding investor-state arbitration in Part B. The investor rights and protections are the
same in each (National Treatment, MFN Treatment, Minimum Standard of Treatment,
Expropriation and Compensation, Transfers, Performance Requirements, Senior Management of
Boards and Directors). Recently enacted FTAs, DR-CAFTA and Peru, also contain provisions
for non-discriminatory treatment of investors, including restitution and/or compensation for any
investment losses coming from armed conflict or civil strife. See U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 10,
at art. 10.6; DR-CAFTA, supra note 10, art. 10.6.
124. See infra at note 128 for a discussion of IP chapters.
125. All U.S. FTAs cover government procurement. The FTAs on this topic open up more
trade than commitments under the Agreement on Government Procurement. See, e.g., U.S.-Peru
FTA, supra note 10, ch. 9.
126. All of the U.S. FTAs have chapters on sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards and
technical barriers to trade. Standards pose perhaps the most significant non-tariff barrier to trade
because developing country FTA partners facing the United States—with its high standards—
must make sure their products are compatible in order to access the market. See, e.g., U.S.-Peru
FTA, supra note 10, ch. 6.
127. The labor and environmental chapters of U.S. FTAs have been controversial since
NAFTA. Nevertheless, the need to obtain congressional approval has meant that they have been
included in all U.S. FTAs.
128. NAFTA also had provisions devoted to protection for trade secrets, industrial design and
the lay-out design of integrated circuits. NAFTA, supra note 22, arts. 1710, 1713. The recent
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intellectual property rights constitute the minimum protections a party must
provide. The core of the text is comprised of the obligations that must be
assumed with respect to the major forms of intellectual property recognized in
NAFTA: patent, copyright and geographical indications first covered in
NAFTA.129 The final section of the chapters contains all of the civil and
criminal enforcement obligations required by FTA parties.130
During the course of all FTA negotiations, USTR has developed what it
considers to be a “model FTA intellectual property text” that forms the basis
for other agreements.131 Technological developments since NAFTA account
for part of why the model text has evolved.132 However, the text also has
developed around general explicit concerns of the USTR, its advisory
committee on intellectual property (ITAC-15) and U.S. industry about the
status of global intellectual property protection. IPR-based industries have
turned principally toward FTAs to push their agenda on higher standards of
protection and the need to keep up with enforcement procedures to protect
those rights through the FTA process.133 The evolved model text reveals the
U.S. goal of expanding the scope of substantive protections. All recent FTAs
go well beyond TRIPS obligations.134 FTA partners must sign on to an
FTAs have followed the same template of covering trademarks, geographical indications, domain
names on the internet, copyrights and patent, in that order. See U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 10, ch.
16; DR-CAFTA, supra note 10, ch. 15; U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 10, ch.17.
129. INDUSTRY TRADE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
(ITAC-15), THE U.S.-PERU TRADE PROMOTION AGREEMENT (TPA): THE INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY PROVISIONS (2006) at 3 [hereinafter PERU ITAC REPORT], available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Peru_TPA/Reports/asset_upload_file473
_8978.pdf. The exact same language is used in the ITAC-15 report for the pending U.S.-Panama
FTA. See INDUSTRY TRADE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
(ITAC-15), THE U.S.-PANAMA TRADE PROMOTION AGREEMENT (TPA): THE INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY PROVISIONS (2007) at 3 [hereinafter PANAMA ITAC REPORT], available at
http://ustr.gov/assets/
Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Panama_FTA/Reports/asset_upload_file960_11234.pdf.
130. The enforcement chapters have grown in length and complexity. Compare U.S.-Peru
FTA, supra note 10, art. 16.11 with NAFTA, supra note 22, arts. 1714–18.
131. See PERU ITAC REPORT, supra note 129, at 3; see also PANAMA ITAC REPORT, supra
note 129, at 3. (The ITAC reports even follow a model of the IP issues discussed).
132. PERU ITAC REPORT, supra note 129, at 5, states:
“[T]he PTPA takes into account the significant legal and technological developments that
have occurred since the TRIPs and NAFTA agreements entered into force and mirrors,
and, in many areas, improves upon the Singapore, Chile, and CAFTA-DR in order to
establish clear precedents in most key areas of IP protection for future FTA negotiations,
many of which precedents were also followed in the FTAs with Morocco, Bahrain, and
Oman.”
Id.
133. Id. at 4.
134. The ITAC-15 report on the U.S.-Peru FTA states that “the fact that Peru found it in its
own interest to significantly increase its levels of IPR protection beyond that required by TRIPs is
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increasing number of major multilateral IP treaties. The model text requires
extension of the term of protection in two major forms of IP rights—patent and
copyright.135 New FTA agreements are considered successful based on how
closely the extended protection term procured in a particular FTA comes to
U.S. standards.136
The model IP text also emphasizes the growing importance of the
enforcement of IP rights. The U.S. position is that enforcement has lagged
well behind the adoption of IP legislation on standards and that new
technologies, such as the Internet, have made enforcement problems greater.
To date, however, the United States has not been able to obtain its preference
for solving the problem—that FTA partners bind themselves to “specific
performance standards in the area of enforcement.”137 The model text
advances in this area have focused instead on making statutory damages
available for piracy and counterfeiting and extending some of the other civil
remedies made discretionary under the TRIPS Agreement, as well as

testament to the principle that high levels of protection benefits indigenous creators and inventors
in the same manner as they do in developed countries.” Id. at 5.
135. In recent FTAs, the United States has pushed for the extension of copyright term closer
to U.S. levels of life of the author plus ninety-five years. It has only achieved that commitment
with Oman. In the Peru and Panama agreements, the countries would only agree to what ITAC15 calls the compromise of seventy years. PANAMA ITAC REPORT, supra note 129, at 12; PERU
ITAC REPORT, supra note 129, at 12. This goes well beyond the TRIPS minimum standard of
fifty years. TRIPS, supra note 71, art. 12.
With regard to patents, the protection offered would be extended if the issuance of the
patent was subject to “unreasonable delay.” U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 10, art. 16.9(6)(b). Since
developing countries frequently take longer to issue patents than developed countries, this
provision will ensure a patent holder the full enjoyment of the patent term. In the U.S.-Peru FTA,
“unreasonable delay” was the later of five years from filing or three years after an examination
request. PERU ITAC REPORT, supra note 129, at 15. In earlier FTAs, USTR had negotiated even
better terms—the later of four years from filing or two years from examination. Id.
On patents, the FTA also prohibits the marketing approval of generic drugs during the
term of the drug patent. This provision effectively extends the life of the patent since competing
countries must wait until after the patent has run to produce a competing product.
136. See PERU ITAC REPORT, supra note 129, at 5 (urging the USTR to obtain a U.S.-level
standard, as was done in several of the MEFTA bilateral FTAs in future agreements).
137. Id. at 18–19. The United States wants its FTA partners to accept such standards because
despite long term success at obtaining multilateral discipline through rulemaking, the United
States still continues “to suffer billions of dollars in losses due to global piracy, counterfeiting and
other infringements of rights provided in TRIPS (and in the various FTAs)—primarily due to
ineffective enforcement by these trading partners.” Id. at 18.
It is relatively easy for a developing country to legislate new IP rights protection, but
significantly more difficult to enforce those obligations because of the implementation costs
involved, and TRIPS does not provide assistance regarding this issue. See J. Michael Finger, The
Doha Agenda and Development: A View from the Uruguay Round 8–12 (Asian Dev. Bank, ERD
Working Paper No. 21, 2002), available at http://www.adb.org/Documents/ERD/Working_
Papers/wp021.pdf (describing the implementation costs of IP rights obligations).
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expanding provisional and criminal remedies to tackle wide-scale
infringements.138 A review of the types of provisions the United States would
prefer in the criminal remedies context would require an FTA partner to have
its courts adopt sentencing guidelines and widen its conception of search
orders.139 It is clear that the United States would like to import its concepts on
such issues into FTA partners’ legal systems.140
In the WTO-plus evolution of the model, other chapters have now become
standard: electronic commerce,141 transparency/anti-corruption142 and trade
capacity building.143 When the NAFTA model was established, electronic

138. PERU ITAC REPORT, supra note 129, at 19–20. See U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 10, at
art. 16.11(11–17) (civil remedies), art. 16.11(18–25) (provisional remedies), art. 16.11(26–28)
(criminal remedies).
139. PERU ITAC REPORT, supra note 129, at 22–23.
140. Id.
141. The chapters on electronic commerce were first added to the model in the agreements
with Chile, Singapore, Australia and Morocco. See U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 10, ch. 15; U.S.Singapore FTA, supra note 10, ch. 14; U.S.-Australia FTA, supra note 10, ch. 16; U.S.-Morocco
FTA, supra note 10, ch. 14.
142. The chapters on transparency and corruption provisions first appeared in the FTA with
Morocco. See U.S.-Morocco FTA, supra note 10, ch. 18(18.1–18.4) (transparency requiring the
publication of all rules, regulations, and the due process rights allowed citizens concerning
notification, administrative proceedings and review and appeal of administrative or judicial
proceedings); ch. 18(18.5) (measures criminalizing corrupt payments). The other two FTAs
negotiated and enacted at around the same time, with Chile and Australia, have the transparency
obligations but no provision on anti-corruption. U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 10, ch. 20; U.S.Australia FTA, supra note 10, ch. 20; U.S.-Morocco FTA, supra note 10, ch. 14. All of the
recent FTAs (DR-CAFTA, Peru and the pending FTAs with Panama, Colombia and KORUS)
have a slightly expanded section on anti-corruption. DR-CAFTA, supra note 10, ch. 18, sec. B;
U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 10, ch. 19, sec. B; U.S.-Panama FTA, supra note 10, ch. 18, sec. B;
U.S.-Colombia FTA, supra note 10, ch. 19, sec. B; KORUS, supra note 10, ch. 21, art. 21.6.
Transparency has always been a core principle of U.S. FTAs. See NAFTA, supra note
22, art. 102(1) (stating that one of the objectives of NAFTA is transparency). By placing the
transparency obligations in a separate chapter, the WTO-plus model underscores the connection
between good governance and strong economics. Anti-corruption is now widely regarded as one
of the biggest constraints facing developing countries as they pursue economic growth. Omar
Azfar, Young Lee & Anand Swamy, The Causes and Consequences of Corruption, 573 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 42, 43–44 (2001). The World Bank, with its mission of eradicating
poverty, for example, has made anti-corruption a priority, aiming its efforts at World Bank
projects. The link between corruption and development has attracted a great deal of attention.
See generally id. at 50–53 (noting studies that have found corruption negatively impacts both the
rate of investment and GDP growth, and that better institutional quality is linked to economic
growth).
143. Trade Capacity Building was first added to U.S. FTAs in the DR-CAFTA. See DRCAFTA, supra note 10, ch. 19, sec. B. See generally U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 10, ch. 20; U.S.Panama FTA, supra note 10, ch. 19; U.S.-Colombia FTA, supra note 10, ch. 20 (containing
similar provisions). Befitting its level of economic development, KORUS lacks any trade
capacity building provisions. KORUS, supra note 10. The United States coordinates trade
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commerce was non-existent (though it later became an issue of concern). The
transparency/anti-corruption and trade capacity building chapters were added
in response to the shift in FTAs partners that occurred over time. Some recent
FTA partners—particularly those in Latin America—are at much lower levels
of development than previous partners.144 Areas of particular concern to these
countries are the need to improve governance (hence the inclusion of a
transparency/anti-corruption chapter) and to build up the capacity to benefit
from trade agreements (which lead to the addition of the trade capacity
building chapter).
Other issues have deliberately been kept out of either U.S. model. The
United States will not subject the entire area of agriculture to the FTA process,
and it takes the position that this can only be dealt with at the multilateral
level.145 Two other issues are also off the table in U.S. FTA negotiations:

capacity building assistance through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).
Trade capacity building was aimed at assisting countries with accession to and implementation of
WTO agreements and to “build the physical, human, and institutional capacity to benefit more
broadly from a rules-based trading system.” U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, U.S. TRADE
CAPACITY BUILDING EXTENSIVE BUT ITS EFFECTIVENESS HAS YET TO BE EVALUATED 3,
GAO-05-150 (2005), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05150.pdf [hereinafter GAO 2005
REPORT]. The connection to U.S. FTAs is the existence of a USAID/USTR interagency group
formed to assist countries involved in free trade negotiations. Such efforts were made with regard
to DR-CAFTA. Id. at 3–4. Congress began to appropriate funds for trade capacity building
programs in 2003. Id. at 6–7. The largest proportion of projects funded out of trade capacity
building was for trade facilitation, which includes customs operation and administration as well
as regional trade agreement capacity (defined as “to increase the ability of regional trade
agreements and individual countries to facilitate trade and help potential regional trade agreement
members”). Id. at 9.
Trade Capacity Building (TCB) Projects aimed at the Latin American FTA partners of
the United States include: a project in Central America “to improve labor law compliance” and in
El Salvador a project to help Salvadoran food producers meet sanitary and phytosanitary
standards with regard to exports of fruits and vegetables. Id. at 13–14. The USAID approach to
regional economic growth in Central America has been done by “taking stock of each
government’s capabilities through diagnostic tools.” Id. at 22. During negotiations for recent
FTAs, particularly those in Central America and the Andean region, the USTR led a working
group on trade capacity building to help the countries implement the FTAs. Id. at 26. The USTR
suggests trade capacity building initiatives, but actual projects are worked out later. Id.
In its most recent self report to the WTO, the United States described FTAs as capable of
promoting innovation and providing participating countries “with trade capacity building to
develop negotiating skills promoting investment, job creation and higher business standards.”
US/TPR, supra note 21, at 17.
144. Honduras and Nicaragua are the least-developed countries.
145. The United States refused to negotiate over the major agricultural barriers facing
developing countries (tariff peaks and escalation and production subsidies) even in hemispheric
FTAA negotiations. It has never been on the table in any bilateral FTA.
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unfair trade statutes146 and labor mobility.147 The reasons for their exclusion
are not based on a perceived lack of importance; to the contrary, both issues
have great impact on trade in goods (unfair trade statutes) and trade in services
(labor mobility). Both unfair trade statutes and labor mobility, however, are so
controversial and politically charged that any inclusion would probably kill a
U.S. FTA.148
In the case of unfair trade statutes, they play several vital roles in design of
U.S. trade policy. First, the historical roots of both the anti-dumping and
countervailing duty laws are quite deep. Second, the United States has long
been committed to relative openness. Without the safety value of unfair trade
statutes for ailing/uncompetitive industries, the United States would face far
greater cries of protectionism. In the U.S.-Canada FTA and NAFTA, the
United States resisted arguments for abolishing or reforming the legislation
and instead substituted dispute resolution in its place.149 For later FTAs, the
subject has not been covered at all.
In the case of labor mobility, although greater openness in this area would
be of great interest and advantage to developing country FTA partners, it is
also unlikely to join the model.150 Allowing true mobility, particularly of
unskilled labor, would involve major changes to U.S. domestic immigration
policy. For the first time an FTA would entail major domestic implementation
problems, something that is routine for its developing country FTA partners.
Since labor mobility would not be an area of U.S. comparative advantage,
there is no incentive for the United States to engage on this issue.

146. U.S. FTAs do have rules on safeguards but not on the anti-dumping and countervailing
duty rules of the parties. This is true even though neither of the U.S. trade partners in NAFTA
wanted antidumping in that free trade agreement. See Sokol, supra note 104, at 278. This poses
a problem for developing countries because the United States aggressively uses its anti-dumping
statute.
147. The only labor-mobility issue in U.S. FTAs is over temporary entry for business visitors,
traders and investors, intra-company transferees and professionals. NAFTA, supra note 22, ch.
16, annex 1603 (spelling out in detail the people who fall into each group).
148. Under the recently expired TPA, the President was required to report to Congress within
180 days before the acceptance of any agreement if such an agreement could impact existing
antidumping laws. See TPA, supra note 28, § 3804(d)(3)(A). It is unlikely that the next
Congress to renew TPA would see the issue differently. One view is that it is the absence of antidumping that makes it possible for key sectors of industry in countries to support trade
agreements. See generally SAFEGUARDS & ANTIDUMPING IN LATIN AMERICAN TRADE
LIBERALIZATION: FIGHTING FIRE WITH FIRE (J. Michael Finger & Julio J. Nogués eds., The
World Bank and Palgrave Macmillan 2006).
149. Sokol, supra note 104, at 278.
150. See generally Karen E. Bravo, Regional Trade Agreements and Labor Liberalization:
(Lost) Opportunities for Experimentation? 28 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 71 (forthcoming 2009)
(giving a complete introduction to the issue of labor mobility).
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IV. DOES THE U.S. FTA APPROACH DELIVER WHAT DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
SEEK?
Developing countries enter into U.S. FTAs to spur economic growth and
development. The major goals a developing country must achieve for an
agreement to have the desired effects are secure market access, increased
foreign direct investment and extensive services sector liberalization. A
developing country also needs to enhance its reputation for good economic
governance in the world community. Making significant progress with respect
to all of these goals should allow a developing country to increase wealth,
competition, employment and productivity.
How useful is a U.S. FTA in delivering these goals to developing
countries? The answer varies based upon how the developing country
negotiates and then implements the FTA. With regard to the first issue, the
developing country must negotiate well on issues where it has voice. This
requires the country to have figured out its biggest needs from the FTA and
constraints it will face in attempting to benefit from the agreement prior to
entering talks. Diagnostic work has been done on such issues for developing
countries but often only after the agreements have been negotiated.151
Given the reality of trade reciprocity with the United States, the developing
country partner must make sure to open up trade early only in products where
it is relatively competitive. The developing country, therefore, must have
negotiated tariff phase-outs carefully or sought exceptions on particular
products from less competitive, rural parts of the country. Some evidence
indicates that the Mexican experience on this point might be a useful
illustration. Mexico suffered significant job loss in rural and poor sections of
the country following NAFTA because its maize sector was uncompetitive.152
In DR-CAFTA, an exception was made for countries facing the same problem
with maize and other food staple products.153
When considering the effects of investment and competition, the
developing country also must make wise choices regarding which service

151. The World Bank has conducted studies on Mexico’s experience under NAFTA to offer
Latin American countries insight LESSONS FROM NAFTA, supra note 80. By the time the study
was out, DR-CAFTA had already been negotiated. Another example is a report done about DRCAFTA after the agreement. See DR-CAFTA Report, supra note 83. Of course, FTA negotiations
are confidential and therefore exact repercussions of key provisions (on tariffs for example) could
not be analyzed prior to completion of an agreement. Nevertheless, given the model nature of
U.S. FTAs, these studies should help developing countries understand that trade agreements alone
are not enough for economic growth and development.
152. See Oliver, supra note 80, at 85–89 (noting the significant loss of agricultural jobs in
Mexico after it opened up to the more efficient and subsidized U.S. imports).
153. DR-CAFTA Report, supra note 83, at 34.
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sectors to liberalize and which to leave off the table.154 In the area of
intellectual property rights, the developing country must assess its ability to
absorb U.S. levels of protection given the inevitable tension between IP rights
and competition, along with the other goals of development.155 For most

154. This issue can be a difficult one for a developing country. In the DR-CAFTA
negotiations, Costa Rica agreed to open up two service sectors, telecommunications and
insurance, both state-owned monopolies that it had not liberalized earlier in the 1990s. The
decision by the government not to open earlier was due to strong public opposition to the idea.
DR-CAFTA Report, supra note 83, at 44. Under DR-CAFTA, Costa Rica agreed to a partial
opening in three areas (private network services, internet services and wireless services) over a
phase-in period. On the eve of the referendum vote, one of the issues pushed by anti-DR-CAFTA
forces was that it would damage such state-run companies. Marla Dickerson, Costa Rica Appears
to Seal CAFTA, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2007, at C1; ICT Chamber Outlines Benefits of FTA for IT
Industry, BUSINESS NEWS AMERICAS, Oct. 17, 2007, http://www.bnamericas.com/story.xsql?id_
sector=1&id_noticia=410399&Tx_idioma=I&source= (noting that the main sticking point in the
referendum was “the obligation to partially liberalize the telecommunication market”).
Telecommunications providers play a critical role in globalization. Without the best
support for this crucial area of infrastructure, it is harder for domestic firms to enter into the real
way business is done—through global production chains. See Grant Aldonas, Keynote Address:
What Would We Bargain for if Development Mattered?, 24 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 29, 36–37
(2007) (The author noted that what the world trading system really needed to negotiate for in a
development round would be agriculture, health care, complete liberalization of trade in
telecommunications—both goods and services—as well as finance and transportation. According
to Aldonas the revolution in communications is part of what makes the global supply chain
possible.) See also Trade and Development Report, 2007, supra note 6, at 45 (noting that to aid
in development the provision of physical infrastructure, “particularly transport and
communications networks, can be as if not more important than the reduction of tariff barriers
and formal quantitative restrictions”).
155. See generally Peter M. Gerhart, The Tragedy of TRIPs, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 143, 172
(pointing out that the WTO is not the appropriate forum for negotiating IP law because “the
decision of intellectual property systems requires very careful attention to distributive issue, and
those distributive issues are difficult to address when law is made by exchanges between nation
states”).
The U.S. FTA negotiating process also does not allow for negotiations over distributive
issues. What is tabled for discussion is the model text which aims to expand rights as closely as
possible to the U.S. standard. Consequently, issues that could be of great import to developing
countries, such as legal protection of traditional knowledge, is not really a part of the dialogue.
Currently, there is no multilateral treatment of the issue at the WTO level. In recent U.S. FTAs,
there is only an understanding between the United States and Peru regarding biodiversity and
traditional knowledge. The understanding is limited to the two governments acknowledging the
importance of the issue and a pledge “to share information that may have a bearing on
patentability of inventions based on traditional knowledge or genetic resources” by making
accessible to each other (1) publicly available databases of relevant information and (2) the
opportunity to cite to patent examining authorities prior art that may have a bearing on
patentability. U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 10, Understanding Regarding Biodiversity and
Traditional Knowledge, http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Peru_TPA/Final
_Texts/asset_upload_file719_9535.pdf.
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developing country partners, this will mean resisting the arguments for most, if
not all, the extensions pushed by the United States.
The other major consequence of dealing with the U.S. model FTA is that
the developing partner inevitably faces significant implementation obligations.
Every area of a model FTA requires implementation legislation and the
dedication of resources.156 For example, to meet trade-in-goods obligations, a
developing country must update its customs administration.157 The FTA tradein-services obligations require altering investment and regulatory legislation
for newly liberalized sectors. The commitment to expanded IP rights and
greater enforcement often requires a complete revision—or, at the very least,
an updating intellectual property legislation. Additionally, every developing
country would have to increase resources for both issuing those IP rights and
making them actionable.158
Assuming the developing country has negotiated well and can satisfy its
implementation obligations, will a U.S. FTA meet its needs? On the issue of
secure market access, the U.S. FTA delivers. The U.S. market will be

In the pending U.S.-Panama FTA, there is a side letter on traditional knowledge whereby
the two governments acknowledge the importance of traditional knowledge folklore and pledge to
work together in the World Intellectual Property Organization on the issue. Most importantly for
Panama, however, the letter contains a most favored nation pledge to consult over whether to
include any provisions relating to traditional knowledge if “the United States and another
government sign a free trade agreement that contains provisions addressing traditional knowledge
of folklore.” See generally POOR PEOPLE’S KNOWLEDGE: PROMOTING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (J. Michael Finger & Philip Schuler eds., The World
Bank and Oxford University Press) (2004).
156. Costa Rica, for example, has passed three pieces of implementing legislation and will
have to pass eight further measures in order for DR-CAFTA to enter into force in that country.
See Costa Rica Deadline, supra note 26.
157. Customs administration is a major aspect of having a workable and effective free trade
agreement. A country cannot access the benefits coming from a free trade agreement if customs
barriers are too high. In the case of DR-CAFTA customs performance “has been traditionally
considered deficient by international standards and customs procedures have often been
considered a major obstacle for business operation in the region.” DR-CAFTA Report, supra
note 83, at 190. In order to deal with these issues, the CAFTA counties will have to deploy a
modernization strategy.
158. A key to dealing with U.S. FTA intellectual property obligations is drafting
implementing legislation that covers all of the issues. The United States has discovered in
dealing with FTA partners that even this first step is difficult. In its report on the U.S.-Panama
FTA, the ITAC-15 advisory group noted that at least one FTA partner (Bahrain) has implemented
non-compliant legislation and urged USTR to carefully “review all implementing legislation after
it has been adopted to ensure that no FTA enters into force until compliance is achieved.”
PANAMA ITAC REPORT, supra note 129, at 3.
The United States has also encountered implementation (through enforcement) of almost
every recent FTA. See PERU ITAC REPORT, supra note 129, at 6 (noting implementation
problems that U.S. industry has encountered in Jordan, Chile, Australia, Singapore and some of
the DR-CAFTA countries, including the Dominican Republic, and Bahrain).
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relatively open, and that will not change. Empirical evidence from the
Mexican experience suggests that trade volumes will grow and that the United
States will absorb an even greater proportion of the FTA partner’s trade.159
The developing country may, as Mexico has done, find that its business cycle
even comes to correspond to that of the United States.160 What a developing
country needs, however, for the FTA to be successful, is effective market
access. There are constraints on such access. The FTA partner must have the
ability to exploit the U.S. market by having exports of value and be able to
satisfy U.S. standards.161 Additionally, the developing country must be able to
export even in the face of regular U.S. use of unfair trade statutes.
With regard to the issue of foreign direct investment, a U.S. FTA can be
very valuable. Returning to the Mexican illustration, Mexico saw growth in
investment following NAFTA.162 Additionally, it has continued to be one of
the top developing country recipients of Foreign Directive Investment (FDI).
Higher levels of investment, however, are not guaranteed and are not the only
measure of the success of an FTA. Mexico’s experience with NAFTA
provides a valuable measuring rod and comparison. As the first move toward
159. Before NAFTA, Mexico faced a trade deficit with the United States. Ten years after its
entry into force it was running a trade surplus of $28.9 billion. See Oliver, supra note 80, at 74.
Mexico is also more important trading partner of the U.S.—the second most important market for
U.S. agriculture exports. Press Release, USTR, U.S.-Mexican Officials Meet to Discuss NAFTA
(Jan. 11, 2008), http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2008/January/US_
Mexican_Officials_Meet_to_Discuss_NAFTA.html. See also Trade and Development Report,
2007, supra note 6, at 70 (noting the increase in intraregional trade for Mexico as a result of
NAFTA and the focus of those exports on the United States so that Mexico is “the developing
country with the highest concentration of exports to a single destination and the one with the
largest increase in export opportunities from world import demand growth”).
160. Trade and Development Report, 2007, supra note 6, at 66.
161. U.S. standards pose greater compliance costs for developing countries trying to enter a
developed country’s market since they are “mainly standard-takers not standard makers.”
Globalization for Development, supra note 11, at 6. The costs for compliance are estimated to
cause a 10% decrease on potential export earnings. Globalization for Development, supra note
11, at 6. The United States did make efforts during the DR-CAFTA negotiating process to begin
working with the Central American countries on how to satisfy U.S. standards for particular
products of major export interest to those countries. DR-CAFTA Report, supra note 83, at 35.
The negotiations also discussed support for technical assistance on standards issues and
commitments were made for a continuation of such assistance from the U.S. and Sanitary and
agricultural agencies. DR-CAFTA Report, supra note 83, at 35 n.7.
162. Trade and Development Report, 2007, supra note 6, at 74 (investment levels almost
quadrupled from the period before NAFTA (1990–94) when they averaged $5 per year to 2000–
2004 when they were $19 billion per year). The United States has been the largest source of
FDI—contributing sixty-four percent of Mexico’s FDI in 2006. See Tamara Lothian & Katharina
Pistor, Local Institutions, Foreign Investment and Alternative Strategies for Development: Some
Views From Practice, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 101, 109 (2003) (Investment law plays a
minor role in the decision to enter a market and other factors play a role—access to new
materials, size/scope of the market, geographic position of the country compared to others.).
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an open investment environment and as a geographically contiguous trading
partner, Mexico was in a privileged position to gain additional investment.
The other developing countries in Latin America—DR-CAFTA, Colombia,
Peru, Panama—will not share either of Mexico’s advantages. It is fairly clear
that having a pro-investment legal regime is one of the reasons investment
flows increase. However, other factors are now widely recognized as being
crucial, if not exactly equal, determinants of where investments are made.163
The recent U.S. developing country FTA partners have preconditions—
underdeveloped infrastructure (particularly transport, telecommunications and
ports),164 underdeveloped workforce (relatively low levels of education and
skills),165 weak macroeconomic policy166 and governance problems (security
and corruption)167—that could limit relatively high investment levels until
these issues are addressed. The U.S. FTA will provide some assistance
through trade capacity building168 and the implementation of services

163. Countries have to make investments in the things that are necessary to attract
investment—physical infrastructure (transport), telecommunications, institutional and regulatory
reforms. See DR-CAFTA Report, supra note 83, at 2.
164. See id. (specifying that all of the Central American countries have to work on
transportation issues (road quality and diversity) and ports).
165. See id. at 11–12 (noting that all of the Central American countries need to work on
secondary education and some—Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua—on primary education).
166. The decisions countries make on these issues can be crucial to what happens to a
country’s economic growth and development. It is difficult to assess exactly how NAFTA has
impacted Mexico in part because of the effects of Mexico’s use of capital inflows before NAFTA
and its approach to inflation (anchoring the peso to the U.S. dollar). Going into NAFTA, Mexico
had an overvalued currency and a significant current account deficit. Trade and Development
Report, 2007, supra note 6, at 74.
167. DR-CAFTA Report, supra note 83, at 11–12 (noting the work that several Central
American countries must do on governance issues).
168. The U.S. commitment to trade capacity in the model FTAs is to create a committee on
Trade Capacity Building for each agreement. The developing country partners are expected to
periodically update and provide the Committee its national trade capacity building strategy. In
turn the Committee will seek to: (1) prioritize projects at a national or regional level (or both); (2)
invite donor institutions and other groups to assist in developing and implementing the projects;
(3) assist with the implementation of projects; and (4) monitor and assess progress in
implementing progress. The TCB Committee is required to meet at least twice a year during the
transition period.
The TCB Chapter is notable for what it lacks. There is no textual commitment to
financial assistance by the United States for these projects. The United States does provide such
assistance through a general trade capacity building aimed at all trading partners. See infra note
184. The fact that a developing country is a free trade agreement partner, however, does not
necessarily guarantee it more assistance or more timely assistance.
The United States provided $7.1 billion in trade capacity building assistance from 2001–
2007. Latin America and the Caribbean area have received $1.9 billion during that time frame
and $554 million in 2007. US/TPR, supra note 21, at 23. The Central American countries have
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liberalization for infrastructure issues.169 The other constraints, however, fall
largely outside the parameters of the FTA. Investment also cannot be dictated.
The developing country may not get investment of the type that will facilitate
technology transfer and help the country move up the industrial policy
chain.170 Lesser-developed countries in a regional country grouping, such as
Honduras and Nicaragua in DR-CAFTA, will undoubtedly find themselves
less preferred investment targets than their more developed partners.171
Extensive service sector liberalization will probably create more efficient
and competitive services.172 Developing countries stand to gain particularly

received $650 million in trade-related assistance since 2003, and it has focused on rural and
poverty reduction. CAFTA-DR FACTS, supra note 95.
The largest recent contributions come from the Millennium Challenge Corporation
(MCC) and focus on infrastructure development agricultural issues. These include a $215 million
dollar compact with Honduras to upgrade roads and promote agricultural development (June
2005); a $175 million dollar compact with Nicaragua (July 2005) to improve highways to link
producers to regional marketing; and a $461 million compact with El Salvador to deal with
promoting education, enterprise development and transport infrastructure. Id.
Not all of the DR-CAFTA countries have benefitted from the MCC program. Although
they are eligible for assistance, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic have not yet satisfied the
eligibility requirements for an MCC compact. Id.
169. For example, the FTA opening services sectors, such as telecommunications, should
attract outside investment, which will result in the upgrading of this type of infrastructure.
170. Mexico offers an illustration of this phenomenon. Mexican producers have become part
of a regional industrial bloc. Thus far, however, Mexico has not been able to move significantly
up the production chain into full-scale production of skill- and technology-intensive goods.
Instead, Mexican companies have been “involved mainly in the low-skill, assembly stages of the
production of such goods. Trade and Development Report, 2007, supra note 6, at 72. See also
Oliver, supra note 80, at 83 (noting that export manufacturing “tends to be based on a production
model in which component parts are imported to Mexico for processing or assembly and then reexported[,]” and that Mexico would need to shift more to a model in which domestic firms
constituted a larger part of the chain of production to have spill over effects on other parts of the
economy).
171. Costa Rica is the most developed of the DR-CAFTA countries. It has already become a
center for computer-related industries in Latin America. Leading U.S. producers Cisco Systems,
Oracle, Hewlett-Packard and Intel all have major operations in the country. Business News
Americas, supra note 26. Costa Rica has been better at attracting such investments because
“higher quality of its research institutions and collaboration with private firms.” DR-CAFTA
Report, supra note 83, at 92.
Even so, Costa Rica still has much work to do on its own investments in research and
development, which are low compared to countries of the same size, labor force and exports to
the United States. DR-CAFTA Report, supra note 83, at 192–94. According to the World Bank,
this is linked to deficiencies in “the area of financial depth, the production of intellectual property
rights, the ability to mobilize government resources, and the quality of research institutions.” Id.
at 194.
172. Increased services can generate “significant development gains”—far more than from
increasing exports of primary commodities and manufacturers alone. See Globalization For
Development, supra note 11, at 39. In order to achieve development—enhancing liberalization—
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from liberalizing financial services and traditional utility monopolies. One
consequence, however, may be the loss of ownership by local service providers
without necessarily improving credit availability for the developing country.173
Recent economics scholarship174 and analyses of the impact of U.S. free
trade agreements on developing country partners175 point to similar
conclusions. Trade liberalization and financial openness alone are not enough
to create economic growth and development. To benefit from undertaking
trade-linked reforms, the developing country needs to cultivate a
complementary domestic policy agenda.176 In the case of a developing country
entering into a U.S. FTA, the development strategy must cover not only the
implementation demands of the FTA but also industrial policy as well as
institutional and governance reform.177 To be effective, this domestic agenda
must confront the binding constraints a particular country faces in its
integration into the global economy.178 This prescription for a developing

a development country has to emphasize the role of regulation and a national services strategy.
Id. at 40, 44.
173. See Trade and Development Report, 2007, supra note 6, at 76–77 (noting that while
foreign ownership of the banking system in Mexico has risen to approximately 80% this has not
led to improved credit access for Mexican firms).
174. See generally Ricardo Hausmann, Dani Rodrik & Andres Velasco, Growth Diagnostics
in THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS RECONSIDERED: TOWARDS A NEW GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
(Narcis Serra & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., Oxford 2008). See also Dani Rodrik, The New
Development Economics: We Shall Experiment, But How Shall We Learn? 24–28 (May 21,
2008) (unpublished paper, Harvard University), available at http://ksghome.harvard.edu/
~drodrik/The%20New%20Development%20Economics.pdf (discussing the new development
economics approach as one based on developing country-specific growth strategic and
innovations in industrial policy); Yong Shik Lee, Foreign Direct Investment and Regional Trade
Liberalization: A Viable Answer for Economic Development, 39 J. WORLD TRADE 701 (2003);
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Swimming in the Spaghetti Bowl: Challenges for
Developing Countries Under The “New Regionalism,” (2004) (prepared by Luis Abugattas
Majluf), available at http://unctad.org/en/docs/itcdtab28_en.pdf.
175. See LESSONS FROM NAFTA, supra note 80; DR-CAFTA Report, supra note 83.
176. Institutional and regulatory reforms are necessary for firms and workers in developing
countries to seek out the opportunities that come from an FTA. DR-CAFTA, supra note 83, at
174. The Central American countries suffer from an excessive regulation (which slows down
start up times for firms) and relatively high levels of administrative corruption which can also
impose costs on FTA opportunities. Id. at 174, 185–88.
177. WORLD BANK, ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE 1990S: LEARNING FROM A DECADE OF
REFORMS 147–48 (The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank
2005), available at http://www1.worldbank.org/prem/lessons1990s/chaps/05-Ch05_kl.pdf
(evaluating what actually happened to developing countries pursuing globalization and also notes
that signing regional agreements “will not generate positive export and growth responses unless
the countries themselves also pursue other necessary economic, political, and social reforms”).
178. DR-CAFTA Report, supra note 83, at 2, 174–201 (analyzing what the DR-CAFTA
countries will have to work on with regard to trade facilitations, institutional reform (including
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country—that it focus on the particular constraints it faces—is a difficult one
for a country entering into a U.S. FTA. One effect of the model FTA is that it
dictates many crucial decisions for a developing country concerning the pace
and extent of trade and investment liberalization and the content of its
regulatory approach to services, intellectual property and standards. It can be
fairly characterized as a “one size fits all” prescription for how to develop.
Accepting this model results in a loss of policy space for a country to deal with
its particular limitations.179 Some of the suggested policy approaches that
might aid a developing country—caution in embracing import liberalization,
subsidizing exports and controlling how to deal with intellectual property
rights—are taken off the table by a U.S. FTA.180
Policy space, however, is never infinite in a globalized world. No country,
particularly a small developing country, has the freedom to develop
undisturbed. One feature of the world a developing country faces is a global
legal system that pushes for goals sought by developed countries. If it appears
the advantages to be gained from joining a U.S. FTA or the risks of isolation
by staying out are too high, a developing country will pursue the free trade
agreement. Consequently, what a developing country must figure out is how
to create a national development strategy that complements the free trade
directives. What remains available are investments in infrastructure and
human capital constraints and subsidies for regional development within the
country. Mexico has made some steps in these directions but, even after
fifteen years, has not gone far enough to reach some of the development goals
of NAFTA.181
V. WHAT IF THE UNITED STATES COMMITTED TO ALTERING THE MODEL TO
EMBRACE DEVELOPMENT?
If the United States wants to aid in the development of its closest
developing trading partners, it needs to reconfigure the model FTA. What
would it take to achieve such a reconfiguration? The first requirement would
be for the United States to embrace its role in leading developmental
assistance. One way to do this would be to use the laboratory of its recent
bilateral FTAs to figure out what would help its developing country partners

anti-corruption efforts) and commitments to education and the research and development needed
for innovation).
179. See generally Trade and Development Report, 2007, supra note 6, at 57–65 (providing a
complete analysis of all of the ways in which a developing country entering into a North-South
FTA can lose policy space).
180. See Trade and Development Report, 2007, supra note 6, at 65; Dani Rodrik, How to
Save Globalization from its Cheerleaders 13–15 (Sept. 2007) (unpublished paper, Harvard
University); Lee, supra note 174, at 706–11.
181. Trade and Development Report, 2007, supra note 6, at 65–81.
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adjust to the globalized world. Such a reconfiguration would be valuable at a
time when the EC is also making moves in this direction.182
In order to achieve such a reconfiguration, a shift by both Congress and the
Executive Branch would be required. Congress has used its trade promotion
authority in the past to constrain the President and to focus largely on domestic
impacts that occur when the United States makes trade policy. Large changes
would therefore be needed for Congress to shift. Adding development
assistance as a negotiating objective and gaining a greater voice over FTA
partner selection183—with potential developmental success as a key rationale—
would change U.S. policy. The forthcoming debate on TPA authority that
awaits President Obama would offer the opportunity for such a shift by
Congress.
There would also have to be a shift by the executive branch. The President
would have to put multilateralism first and focus executive energies and
commitments on breaking through the recent impasses at the WTO. By
completing a Doha Round that offers enough discipline over agriculture to aid
developing countries, the United States would achieve a true breakthrough for
developing countries. Such a shift would require the United States to abandon
the “competitive liberalization” approach and substitute it with a focus on
making its laboratory of FTAs models of good development policy. Instead,

182. The EC has also been pursuing regionalism during the slow down period at the WTO.
See id. The most recent effort of the EC is its negotiating of Economic Partnership Agreements
(EPA). See id. at 56. These agreements—replacing the long-standing preference programs with
the ACP countries—place an overt focus on development. Id. These agreements are with
countries that closely resemble recent U.S. FTA partners. In the EPA the EC completed late in
2007 with the CARIFORUM states, the parties “reaffirm the objective of sustainable
development[,]” recognize that “development cooperation is a crucial element of their
Partnership” and that this cooperation can take financial and non-financial forms.” Economic
Partnership Agreement Between the CARIFORUM States, of the One Part, and the European
Community and its Member States of the Other Part 13, 16, Dec. 17, 2007, available at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/february/tradoc_137971.pdf. The EC commits itself to
the financing pertaining to development cooperation out of its general budget. Id. at 17.
The EPA also contains cooperation priorities aimed at the biggest adjustment problems
the CARIFORUM states will face by entering into a free trade agreement with the EC—
assistance for capacity/institution building for tax administration assist with the loss of revenues
from tariffs; support for the private sector and enterprise development and the diversifying
exports through new investment and the development of new sectors; assist with development of
and compliance with standards; and support for the development of infrastructure. Id. at 18–19.
183. In an earlier version of “fast track” (the Tariff and Trade Act of 1974) there was a
requirement that the President notify Congress of the intent to begin trade negotiations at least
sixty days in advance. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 401(a), 98 Stat. 2948
(1984). This “gatekeeper” provision allows either the House of the Senate the option of denying
fast track treatment by voting to disapprove of the negotiations. GAO 2007 REPORT, supra note
45, at 48, app. II. The TPA did not include this provision. Id. According to the GAO, the former
USTR negotiators it interviewed were opposed to the reinclusion of the provision. Id.
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the President should alter the model FTA and shape any new agreements into
laboratories for good development policy. One part of this shift would have to
include restraint on pushing for any more U.S.-level commitments by FTA
partners.
In order to achieve its new goal, the United States would have to make a
full-scale commitment to more effective trade capacity building.184 In this
reconfiguration, trade capacity building would play a central role in the model
FTA. The United States would need to continue using a TCB working
committee during negotiations to isolate the key constraints its trading partner
would face in accepting and implementing an FTA. It would have to do this in
conjunction with the national development strategy put forward by the FTA
partner. The United States would then have to work with that country to gear
up TCB projects that would start as soon as the FTA is enacted in the United
States—as opposed to the later entry into force for its partner—so that a
developing country partner would have immediate help to adjust during the
implementation period. The contents of the TCB program would have to
require not only financial resources, but also technical assistance (expertise and
training) in each area noted by the national development strategy.
Every trade capacity project would then have to be assessed (for
completion and success) and adopted in response to experiences learned.
Developing country FTA partners would benefit from such a reconfiguration
of the model. However, the United States would also gain. Trading partners
achieving higher levels of growth and convergence with developed countries’
standards would export fewer of their problems185 to the United States. More
importantly, the United States could establish a reputation as the true leader of
developed-focused multilateralism.

184. The current TCB program lacks systematic monitoring of TCB projects and has not
developed performance indicators or compiled performance data about projects. GAO 2005
REPORT, supra note 143, at 29. Despite making substantial financial commitments to TCB
programs, the U.S. agencies involved have not “specifically conducted program evaluations to
assess the effectiveness of their trade capacity building efforts.” Id.
To improve how it does trade capacity building, the United States needs to think through
what role it wants for the program. A systematic diagnosis of the adjustment issues faced by
developing country partners (available from work conducted by the World Bank) would be a
starting point. Then, if the goal is to demonstrate how the FTA can complement development,
TCB projects would need to be driven by the national development strategy of the developing
country partner.
185. The most obvious export is illegal immigration caused by the structural problems of the
Mexican economy brought on in part by its adjustments to NAFTA (particularly the loss of jobs
in the agriculture sector). See Trade and Development Report, 2007, supra note 6, at 77–78
(estimating that the number of Mexicans living in the United States without legal resident permits
was approximately six million in 2005). See also Oliver, supra note 80, at 117–30 (providing a
complete discussion of the reasons for the emigration of Mexican citizens).
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